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Paternalism, Self-Governance, and Public
Health: The Case of E-Cigarettes
WENDY E. PARMET
This article develops a normative framework for assessing public health laws, using the regulation of e-cigarettes as a case study. Although e-cigarettes are likely far
less dangerous to individual users than traditional cigarettes, it remains uncertain whether their proliferation will
lead to a reduction of smoking-related disease and deaths
or to increased morbidity and mortality. This scientific uncertainty, presents regulators with difficult challenges in determining whether and how to regulate e-cigarettes. This article presents a normative framework for analyzing such
questions by offering three justifications for public health
laws: impaired agency, harm to others, and self-governance.
Each justification responds to the common charge that public health laws are impermissibly paternalistic. The selfgovernance rationale, which is the most robust, and most reflective of public health’s own population perspective, has
been the least theorized. This article develops that theory,
examining the basis for the justification as well as its limitations. The article then applies its normative framework to the
regulation of e-cigarettes, focusing on the FDA’s so-called
deeming regulations, which at the time the article was written were pending but have since been promulgated in a sub-
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stantially similar form. The article supports the FDA’s ultimate decision to ban the sales of e-cigarettes to minors and
to require the disclosure of warning labels based upon the
impaired agency rationale. However, the scientific uncertainty renders the harm rationale inadequate. As a result, the
regulations’ pre-market review requirement must rely on the
self-governance rationale for its normative justification.
Given the lack of clear legislative guidance and political engagement, the article concludes that the pre-market review
provisions are normatively problematic: if public health advocates want to claim the mantle of self-governance, they
must take it seriously.
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INTRODUCTION
After decades of dramatic declines in the rate of cigarette smoking,1 we face a crossroad in the battle against tobacco-related disease. The increasing popularity of e-cigarettes offers either a novel
tool for further reductions in cigarette use or a dangerous lure that
may lead a new generation to smoke. The uncertainty as to which
role e-cigarettes will play presents public health regulators with a
difficult dilemma: whether and how to apply the panoply of tobacco
control laws that has been used to reduce cigarette smoking to ecigarettes. This dilemma implicates not only legal and scientific
questions, but also normative ones concerning the government’s
role in protecting public health, especially in the face of scientific
uncertainty. This article tackles these issues and, in so doing, presents a framework for analyzing the justifiability of public health
laws.
E-cigarettes are the most popular form of electronic nicotine delivery systems (“ENDS”).2 They deliver nicotine through the inhalation of a heated vapor rather than combustion. Supporters argue
that they offer a safer alternative to smoking and the opportunity for
a new regulatory strategy, one based on harm reduction.3 Critics, in
1

Trends in Current Cigarette Smoking Among High School Students and
Adults, United States, 1965–2011, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/tables/trends/cig_
smoking/ [hereinafter Trends in Current Cigarette Smoking]. In 2013, only 17.8%
were current smokers. Current Cigarette Smoking Among U.S. Adults Aged 18
Years and Older, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 1, 2015),
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/campaign/tips/resources/data/cigarette-smoking-inunited-states.html#all_adults. Rates of smoking among high school students have
declined from a high of 36.4% in 1997, to only 9.2% in 2014. Compare Trends in
Current Cigarette Smoking, supra, with René A. Arrazola et al., Tobacco Use
Among Middle and High School Students – United States, 2011–2014, 64
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 381, 382 (Apr. 17, 2015),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6414a3.htm [hereinafter Tobacco Use].
2
See infra text accompanying notes 201–206.
3
The possibility of using a harm-reduction approach to smoking has long
been discussed by health experts. See Jack E. Henningfield, The Tobacco Endgame: It’s All About Behavior, 68 PREVENTIVE MED. 11, 13 (2014); E. G. Martin
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contrast, point to potential health risks. They also worry that e-cigarettes will renormalize smoking and reverse declines in smoking
rates.4 Critics thus fear that rather than serving to reduce harm, ecigarettes will prove to be a gateway drug that introduces people to
nicotine and revives the social norms of the Mad Men era.5
For regulators, the difficulty of the question of how to respond
to e-cigarettes is heightened by uncertainty about their long-term
health effects. Critically, the evidence whether e-cigarettes will increase or decrease rates of cigarette smoking remains unsettled.6 In
effect, we don’t yet know whether the proliferation of e-cigarettes
will lead to more or less smoking, or more or less disease. Nor do
we know whether regulations curtailing access to e-cigarettes will
safeguard or harm public health.
The uncertain science raises difficult challenges for regulators.
Should they follow the precautionary principle and regulate e-cigarettes as if they were harmful until and unless they are proved safe?7
Or should regulators wait to see what the science reveals? If they act
too soon, they risk delaying the development of a new approach to
reducing tobacco-related harm and sparking a backlash against public health laws that are viewed as inappropriately paternalistic. Yet
if regulators fail to act quickly, they may face a large entrenched

et al., Tobacco Harm Reduction: What do the Experts Think?, 13 TOBACCO
CONTROL 123, 124 (2004); Kathleen Stratton et al., Clearing the Smoke: The Science Base for Tobacco Harm Reduction—Executive Summary, 10 TOBACCO
CONTROL 189, 189–90 (2001); David Sweanor et al., Tobacco Harm Reduction:
How Rational Public Policy Could Transform a Pandemic, 18 INT’L J. DRUG
POL’Y 70, 70 (2007).
4
See, e.g., David A. Kessler & Matthew L. Myers, Op-Ed., It’s Time to Regulate E-Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
04/23/opinion/its-time-to-regulate-e-cigarettes.html?_r=0. One study found that
even older smokers believe that advertising for e-cigarettes may renormalize
smoking; see Janine K. Cataldo et al., E-cigarette Marketing and Older Smokers:
Road to Renormalization, 39 AM. J. HEALTH BEHAV. 361, 368 (2015).
5
AMC’s Mad Men is a series about an advertising agency, set in the 1960s.
6
For a review of the evidence, see discussion infra Section III.B.
7
The precautionary principle, long recognized in environmental law, calls
for regulations to protect the health or environment from new risks in the absence
of scientific certainty. See Daniela Saitta, Giancarlo Antonio Ferro & Riccardo
Polosa, Achieving Appropriate Regulations for Electronic Cigarettes, 5
THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES CHRONIC DISEASE 50, 52 (2014).
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market for a highly addictive product. By the time the science is in,
it may well be too late to prevent harm.
In the midst of these uncertainties, states and localities have pondered whether to apply their existing tobacco control regulations,
such as laws banning indoor smoking, to e-cigarettes.8 Likewise, the
Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has been forced to consider
whether it should subject e-cigarettes to the regulatory regime established by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act
(“TCA”).9 In April 2014, the FDA issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (“NPRM”) proposing to do just that.10 Over 80,000
comments were submitted in response to the NPRM.11 As of April
2016, it remains unclear what the FDA will do, or whether Congress
will intervene, as the House Appropriations Committee proposed
doing in 2015.12
This paper seeks to guide these regulatory decisions by offering
a framework for determining the normative justifiability of public
health regulations. The framework engages with and responds to
8

Regulators in other nations have been quicker to act than those in the U.S.
See Henningfield, supra note 3, at 14.
9
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 11131, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009).
10
Deeming Tobacco Products to be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act; Regulations on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required Warning Statements for Tobacco Products, 79 Fed. Reg. 23142 (proposed
Apr. 25, 2014) (to be codified at 21 CFR pts. 1100, 1140, 1143).
While this paper was in press, the FDA published the regulations deeming tobacco products to be subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as
Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act: Restrictions on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required Warning
Statements for Tobacco Products, 81 Fed. Reg. 28973 (May 10, 2016) (to be codifid in 21 CFR pts. 1100, 1140, 1143). The final version of the regulations are in
most respects substantially similar to those in the NPRM, however, there are some
differences of note. See, e.g., infra note 322.
11
Deeming Tobacco Products to be Subject to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act;
Regulations on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required
Warning Statements for Tobacco Products, REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov/#!docketDetail;D=FDA-2014-N-0189 (last visited Mar. 9, 2015).
12
H.R. REP. NO. 114-205, at 74–75 (2015). For a discussion, see infra text
accompanying notes 324–328.
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what I call the “paternalism critique.”13 Part of a broader anti-regulatory backlash currently ascendant in the United States, the critique
condemns public health laws relating to noncommunicable diseases
(NCDs) as illegitimate infringements on individual autonomy.14
This critique has made its way into judicial decisions reviewing tobacco control regulations. For example, in striking down on First
Amendment grounds FDA regulations requiring graphic warning labels on cigarettes, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
questioned whether “the government can assert a substantial interest
in discouraging consumers from purchasing a lawful product, even
one that has been conclusively linked to adverse health consequences.”15 Underlying the court’s comment, and the broader critique of public health interventions, is the common supposition that
public health laws aimed at NCDs are the paternalistic16 overreachings of the “nanny state.”17
In response, public health legal theorists have offered several
notable normative justifications for laws addressing NCDs. Three
broad categories of justifications are especially prominent in the literature. One expounds upon the well-established claim that paternalistic laws are justified when an individual’s agency is impaired
13

See discussion infra Part I.
See id.; Wendy E. Parmet & Peter D. Jacobson, The Courts and Public
Health: Caught in a Pincer Movement, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 392, 395 (2014).
This critique is not new. Public health has been on the defensive since the Reagan
era. See Scott Burris, The Invisibility of Public Health: Population-Level
Measures in a Politics of Market Individualism, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1607,
1607 (1997).
15
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1218 n.13 (D.C. Cir.
2012), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 22–23 (D.C.
Cir. 2014).
16
The claim that laws aimed at NCDs are paternalistic is widespread. See,
e.g., David Adam Friedman, Public Health Regulation and the Limits of Paternalism, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1687, 1690–91 (2014); Yofi Tirosh, Three Comments
on Paternalism in Public Health, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1795, 1797 (2014). However,
upon closer analysis, many public health laws that are regarded as paternalistic
may be found not to be so. See Wendy E. Parmet, Beyond Paternalism: Rethinking
the Limits of Public Health Law, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1771, 1783 (2014). For a further discussion of the paternalism critique and responses to it, see infra Part I–
Section III.C.
17
Lindsay F. Wiley, Wendy E. Parmet & Peter D. Jacobson, Adventures in
Nannydom: Reclaiming Collective Action for the Public’s Health, 43 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 73, 73 (2015).
14
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either because of youth, mental impairment, or informational or cognitive deficiencies.18 Laws that try to protect minors from tobacco
use easily satisfy these criteria, but so do, some argue, regulations
requiring the disclosure of product information or, more controversially, regulations that seek to “nudge” people to the choices they
would make if they were fully rational actors.19
A second justification relies on a capacious interpretation of the
harm principle that exposes the not-always-obvious externalities of
public health threats. Utilizing public health’s population perspective,20 which emphasizes the role that population-level social and
environmental factors play in determining health risks, this response
points to the myriad social factors, including law, that affect rates of
NCDs.21 From this perspective, NCDs are quite similar to communicable diseases in that they too are caused by factors outside of the
individual’s control and therefore warrant state intervention.22
A third set of responses is predicated on the insight that public
health laws advance liberty by helping to secure health.23 Moreover,
public health laws can be viewed as manifestations of a population’s
positive liberty of self-governance.24 In other words, public health

18

See infra Section II.A.
Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behavioral Economics and Paternalism, 122 YALE L.J. 1826, 1854–55, 1887–88 (2013).
20
See WENDY E. PARMET, POPULATIONS, PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE LAW, ch.
1 (2009); see also Micah L. Berman, Defining the Field of Public Health Law, 15
DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 45, 47–48, 79–87 (2013).
21
See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, Bloomberg’s Health Legacy: Urban Innovator or Meddling Nanny? 43 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 19, 19 (2013); Zita Lazzarini
& David Gregorio, Personal Health in the Public Domain: Reconciling Individual
Rights with Collective Responsibilities, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1839, 1845–46 (2014).
22
For further discussion, see infra Section II.B.
23
For this reason, Sridhar Venkatapuram argues that health is a meta-capability. See SRIDHAR VENKATAPURAM, HEALTH JUSTICE: AN ARGUMENT FROM
THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 20 (2011); see also Peter D. Jacobson, Changing
the Culture of Health: One Public Health Misstep at a Time, 51 SOC. 221, 222
(2014).
24
Lindsay F. Wiley, Micah L. Berman & Doug Blanke, Who’s Your Nanny?
Choice, Paternalism and Public Health in the Age of Personal Responsibility, 41
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 88, 90–91 (2013).
19
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laws are the legal tools that populations utilize to “assure the conditions for people to be healthy.”25 Seen from this light, public health
laws can enhance liberty as much as restrain it.
What do these justifications suggest about the regulation of ecigarettes? This paper engages this question, concluding that certain
regulations, such as those prohibiting e-cigarette sales to minors or
requiring disclosure of ingredients, easily surmount any paternalism
critique, while the case for restrictions on adult access to e-cigarettes
has not yet been made. More broadly, the approach offered here uses
the case of e-cigarettes to examine both the anti-paternalism critique
of public health law and the justifications proffered by public health
legal theorists. In so doing, the article assesses the strength and viability of the three justifications in an especially difficult case, one in
which the science is not yet settled and the public health community
is fractured, and offers a framework steeped within public health
laws’ own population perspective for analyzing the legitimacy of
public health laws.
I begin in Part I by reviewing the anti-paternalism critique of
public health laws.26 Although the critique is often applied to laws
that, upon closer inspection, are not paternalistic, it serves as a powerful rhetorical device that helps to delegitimize public health laws.
It warrants a response.
Part II offers three distinct responses.27 These responses justify
public health laws relating to NCDs when 1) individual decisionmaking is impaired due to immaturity, incapacity, lack of information, or cognitive deficiencies; 2) the activities regulated can
harm third parties; or 3) the regulation is a manifestation of a population’s self-governance relating to its collective health. Taken together, these justifications provide a powerful rejoinder to the paternalism critique and a framework for assessing the legitimacy of specific public health regulations. The framework offers broader support for public health regulations than many of public health critics
25
COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, INST. OF MED.,
THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH 19 (NAT’L ACAD. PRESS 1988). For a defense of
paternalism, see generally SARAH CONLY, AGAINST AUTONOMY: JUSTIFYING
COERCIVE PATERNALISM (2013) (“The answer I embrace is that we need external
guidance—constraints on our actions through regulation, law, and institutional
design.”).
26
See infra Part I.
27
See infra Part II.
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would endorse, but also imposes more restraints on public health
laws than many public health advocates would like.
In Part III, I turn to the case of e-cigarettes. I begin by discussing
the development of the e-cigarette market and then review what is
and is not known about e-cigarettes’ health effects.28 Part III concludes by laying out the legal context in which current regulatory
decisions are made and the questions pending before the FDA under
the TCA.29
In Part IV, I apply the framework to several specific proposed ecigarette regulations.30 The analysis concludes that the impaired
agency rationale strongly supports laws regulating minors’ access to
e-cigarettes, as well as laws requiring warning labels and ingredient
listings. However, given the scientific uncertainty, only self-governance can justify regulations seeking to limit adults’ access and use
of e-cigarettes. But if such laws must rest on self-governance, selfgovernance must occur. This has already happened in the hundreds
of cities and several states in which democratically elected bodies
have chosen to regulate e-cigarette use. The proposed FDA regulations, however, are more problematic because there has not yet been
a fulsome national dialog about e-cigarettes.31 In the absence of such
signs of self-governance or congressional action, and in the midst of
scientific uncertainty about the population health effects, the proposed regulations stand on a weak normative foundation.
I: THE PATERNALISM CRITIQUE
The questions surrounding the regulation of e-cigarettes have
arisen amid broader debates about the legitimacy of public health
laws aimed at NCDs.32 Briefly, during the nineteenth century, public
28

See infra Sections III.A–B.
See infra Sections III.C–D.
30
See infra Part IV.
31
See infra text accompanying notes 375–385.
32
For reasons explained infra, the assumption that laws aimed at NCDs are
paternalistic is problematic. See infra text accompanying notes 59–65. Public
health laws have also been subject to a wide range of other critiques, including
their impact on marginal populations. See Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as Social
Justice, 24 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 47, 74–75 (2014) (arguing that the use of
law to change behaviors often has a “disproportionate impact on socially disadvantaged groups”); Yofi Tirosh, supra note 16, at 1801–05.
29
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health focused largely on communicable diseases such as smallpox,
tuberculosis, and cholera.33 In response to these threats, health officials wielded various legal tools, including such coercive measures
as isolation, quarantine,34 and mandatory vaccination,35 as well as
less coercive measures, such as supplying clean water and establishing food safety standards.36 By the mid-twentieth century, however,
chronic diseases, including cancer and coronary artery disease, had
replaced infectious diseases as the most significant cause of mortality in developed nations.37 These diseases (and even infectious diseases such as HIV) were widely attributed to individual behavioral
choices,38 leading many public health advocates to support laws that
seek to alter the individual behaviors associated with chronic disease.39
In this context a heated debate arose regarding the scope and legitimacy of public health laws aimed at NCDs.40 In a series of articles, Richard Epstein sought to distinguish what he termed “the old
public health” of the nineteenth century, in which, he claimed, public health laws were confined to the control of communicable diseases and public nuisances from contemporary efforts to address
33

Wendy E. Parmet, From Slaughter-House to Lochner: The Rise and Fall
of the Constitutionalization of Public Health, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 476, 489
(1996). Many laws directed at communicable diseases in the nineteenth century
sought to alter the environment. Id. at 497–98. Conversely, laws often focused on
individuals as if they were contagious even when they were not. See Jew Ho v.
Williamson, 103 F. 10, 25–27 (N.D. Cal. 1900).
34
Wendy E. Parmet, AIDS and Quarantine: The Revival of an Archaic Doctrine, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 53, 58 (1985).
35
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
36
See Parmet, supra note 33, at 489.
37
Abdel R. Omran, The Epidemiologic Transition: A Theory of the Epidemiology of Population Change, 83 MILBANK Q. 731, 736–41 (2005).
38
J. Michael McGinnis & William H. Foege, Actual Causes of Death in the
United States, 270 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2207, 2207 (1993).
39
As discussed further below, these health problems may also be understood
through a broader, ecological lens that focuses more on social and environmental
factors, than individual decisions. See infra text accompanying notes 116–23.
40
An early focus of the debate was motorcycle helmet laws. See Ronald
Bayer, The Continuing Tensions Between Individual Rights and Public Health:
Talking Point on Public Health Versus Civil Liberties, 8 EMBO REP. 1099, 1101–
02 (2007) (explaining that “the failure to make a strong case for paternalistic restrictions with regard to motorcycle helmets” ultimately led to an increase in cyclist fatalities).
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NCDs.41 The more traditional understanding, Epstein argued, is superior to the “capacious view” that utilizes law to affect the health
of “ordinary individuals.”42 To Epstein, “[t]he correct theory of public health tracks the economic conception of public goods, namely
those nonexcludable goods that cannot be given to one unless they
are also given to another.”43
In a related vein, Mark Hall insisted on the importance of differentiating between “public health analysis and public health authority, or, if you will, between public health diagnosis and public health
treatment.”44 For Hall, precisely because public health powers are
so robust, public health laws must be cabined to cases in which there
are significant collective action problems, meaning that individuals
acting in their own self-interest, even if fully informed and rational,
will not effectively address the problem because they do not internalize some of the major costs or benefits of action or non-action, or
for other reasons a centralized response is much more cost-effective.45
Similarly, Mark Rothstein argued that public health itself, not
just public health laws, should be construed narrowly: “[B]ecause
public health has been the justification for some overreaching or

41

Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Old Public Health: The Legal Framework for the Regulation of Public Health, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1421, 1427 (2004).
Scholars have questioned Epstein’s characterization of the old public health. See,
e.g., William J. Novak, Private Wealth and Public Health: A Critique of Richard
Epstein’s Defense of the “Old” Public Health, 46 PERSPS. BIOL. & MED. S176
(2003) (arguing that Epstein’s reading of the “earlier constitutional history of the
police power” is flawed).
42
Epstein, supra note 41, at 1425.
43
Id. at 1425–26; see also Jonny Anomaly, Public Health and Public Goods,
4 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 251, 252–55 (2011). Angus Dawson and Marcel Verweij
do not agree that public health is limited to public goods, but concede that public
health interventions are most justified “where action contributes to the creation or
maintenance of a public good.” Angus Dawson & Marcel Verweij, Introduction:
Ethics, Prevention, and Public Health, in ETHICS, PREVENTION, AND PUBLIC
HEALTH 5 (Angus Dawson & Marcel Verweij eds., 2007).
44
Mark A. Hall, The Scope and Limits of Public Health Law, 46 PERSP. BIOL.
& MED. S199, S202 (2003) (emphasis in original) (“The central point of this essay
is that public health law is much more limited than public health science.”); see
also Mark A. Rothstein, Rethinking the Meaning of Public Health, 30 J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 144, 147 (2002) (arguing for a narrower definition of public health).
45
Hall, supra note 44, at S204 (emphasis in original).
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even reprehensible prior government activities, ranging from eugenics to unethical research on human subjects, a narrow definition of
public health will help steer public health officials away from activities that are inappropriate for the government.”46
Although many public health laws in the twentieth century targeted NCDs, both the scholarly and popular critique of public health
laws in this century have largely focused on laws addressing obesity
and, to a lesser extent, smoking. To critics, the obesity epidemic is
largely the result of individual choices, such as whether to exercise
or to eat fast food.47 At least when made by competent adults, critics
contend, those individual choices should be respected.48 Laws seeking to prohibit or even alter individual choices do not address public
harms, rather they are paternalistic attempts by the state to interfere
in an individual’s choice for the individual’s own good.49
This critique of public health laws, which I shall call “the paternalism critique,” is widespread in both popular discourse50 and the
scholarly literature.51 For example, Peter Schwartz has lamented:
A precondition of freedom is the recognition of the
individual’s capacity to make decisions for himself.
If man were viewed as congenitally incapable of
making rational choices, there would be no basis for
the very concept of rights. Yet that is increasingly
how our government views us. It is adopting the role

46

Rothstein, supra note 44, at 147.
Richard A. Epstein, What (Not) to do About Obesity: A Moderate Aristotelian Answer, 93 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1363 (2005).
48
Id.
49
Richard Epstein contends that “[t]he correct theory of public health tracks
the economic conception of public goods, namely those nonexcludable goods that
cannot be given to one unless they are also given to another.” Epstein, supra note
41, at 1425–26.
50
Karen Harned, The Michael Bloomberg Nanny State in New York: A Cautionary Tale, FORBES (May 10, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/05/10/the-michael-bloomberg-nanny-state-in-new-york-a-cautionary-tale/.
51
Friedman, supra note 16, at 1693.
47
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of a paternalistic nanny, zealously protecting the citizen against his own actions. In the process, our freedom is disappearing.52
Similarly, Jacob Sullum castigated the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) for failing to appreciate the distinction
between smoking and tuberculosis (“TB”): “That distinction matters
to people who reject paternalism as a justification for government
action. We believe the use of force can be justified to protect the
public from TB carriers but not to protect smokers from their own
choices.”53
The critique has even made its way, albeit subtly, into judicial
decisions. For example, in overturning New York City’s ban on the
sale of large portions of sugary soda, the New York Court of Appeals opined that the regulation’s impact on individual autonomy
was a factor to be considered in determining whether the regulation
constituted policymaking that should be left to the legislature.54
In lambasting public health laws as paternalistic, both courts and
critics have generally assumed, often with little or no explanation,
that paternalism is inherently bad,55 or, in the least, that “[t]he burden of proof is on the shoulders of whoever advocates legal coercion.”56 By conjuring the image of the nanny who tells the child

52

Peter Schwartz, The Threat of the Paternalistic State, CAPITALISM MAG.
(Aug. 6, 2002), http://capitalismmagazine.com/2002/08/the-threat-of-the-paternalistic-state/.
53
Jacob Sullum, Ebola, Smoking, and Mission Creep at the CDC: Controlling Contagious Diseases is Just One of Many Items on the Agency’s To-Do List,
REASON, Jan. 2015, at 12.
54
N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t
of Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538, 547–48 (N.Y. 2014). Notably, the
court did not conclude that the state could not regulate in such a manner, only that
the Board of Health could not.
55
The classic critique of paternalism is from John Stuart Mill, who distinguished between self- and other- regarding behaviors, and argued that the government was, with important exceptions, justified in limiting only the latter. See JOHN
STUART MILL, On Liberty, in JOHN STUART MILL: A SELECTION OF HIS WORKS 1,
97 (John M. Robson ed., Macmillan Publ’g Co.1985) (1966). For a lengthy defense of paternalism, see CONLY, supra note 25, at 23–25.
56
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Counting the Dragon’s Teeth and Claws: The Definition of Hard Paternalism, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 664 (2004) (quoting Joel
Feinberg).
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what to do,57 the paternalism critique acts as a trope. Laws labeled
as paternalistic are seen as presumptuous and disrespectful.58 Often
little more needs to be said. As Jeremy A. Blumenthal explained,
“‘paternalism’ itself is often a term of opprobrium, used to disparage
or reject policies without necessarily addressing their merits or demerits.”59
Critics of public health frequently apply the label to public
health laws without considering whether the laws in question are
actually paternalistic. Under common definitions, laws are paternalistic only if they restrict the autonomy of an individual for that individual’s own good.60 Thaddeus Mason Pope states that “[p]aternalism is the restriction of a subject’s self-regarding conduct primarily
for the good of that same subject.”61 So understood, many laws derided as paternalistic may not be. For example, a regulation requiring e-cigarette manufacturers to disclose their ingredients to the
FDA does not limit the autonomy of those who inhale; it simply

57

Former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg was frequently chided
as “Nanny Bloomberg” for his attempts to use municipal powers to improve public health. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 1689; Gostin, supra note 21, at 19.
58
See Christian Coons & Michael Weber, Introduction: Paternalism – Issues
and Trends, in PATERNALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 12 (Christian Coons &
Michael Weber eds., 2013) (“Paternalism objectionably treats its targets like children.”).
59
Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Psychological Defense of Paternalism, in
PATERNALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE, 197, 197 (Christian Coons & Michael
Weber eds., 2013). Despite such use of the term, Blumenthal notes that there is
significant public support for many paternalistic laws. See id. at 213.
60
See, e.g., Gerald Dworkin, Paternalism, 56 THE MONIST 64, 65 (1972) (defining paternalism as “the interference with a person’s liberty of action justified
by reasons referring exclusively to the welfare, good, happiness, needs, interests
or values of the person being coerced”).
61
Pope, supra note 56, at 660. More recently Thaddeus Mason Pope has aptly
noted, “contemporary legal and philosophical literature on paternalism employs a
different vocabulary than the literature of the preceding three decades.” Thaddeus
Mason Pope, Limiting Liberty to Prevent Obesity: Justifiability of Strong Hard
Paternalism in Public Health Regulation, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1859, 1869 (2014).
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burdens manufacturers.62 Because these laws regulate other-regarding behavior, they would not be viewed as paternalistic under traditional definitions.63
Other definitions of paternalism, however, are broader and may
encompass actions taken for a subject’s own good even if they do
not necessarily limit that individual’s own autonomy. Seana Shiffrin
proposes that paternalism exists whenever X acts in a way that limits
Y’s sphere of agency for Y’s good.64 Under this approach, a law
may be paternalistic even if it does not regulate the actions of the
individual whom the law seeks to benefit. Such a definition, however, risks labeling almost all laws paternalistic. For example, a law
that prevents X from poisoning Y could be viewed as limiting Y’s
agency—the option to drink the poison—for Y’s own good.65
Regardless of whether a particular public health law is paternalistic,66 or even if it restricts the liberty of those it wishes to help, the
62

Wendy Mariner makes a similar point, arguing that what she calls the “economic definition of paternalism ignores the target of regulation and instead views
government regulation from the perspective of the individual, rather than the entity being regulated.” Wendy Mariner, Paternalism, Public Health, and Behavioral Economics: A Problematic Combination, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1817, 1823
(2014).
63
Jamie Kelly notes that “[b]ecause both utilitarianism and paternalism share
a focus on individual welfare, it can be difficult to distinguish utilitarian and paternalistic positions in political theory.” Jamie Kelly, Libertarian Paternalism,
Utilitarianism, and Justice, in PATERNALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 216, 228
(Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2013). Nevertheless, if the goal of regulating the tobacco company or soda seller is to improve overall health, rather
than the good of the individual consumer, the measures should not be considered
paternalistic even if we accept that laws can be paternalistic without limiting liberty.
64
See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 218–19 (2000) (arguing
that paternalism exists when X acts in a way that limits Y’s sphere of agency for
the good of Y). Likewise, Thaddeus Mason Pope suggests that such laws can be
thought of as forms of indirect paternalism, arguing that paternalism refers not to
a class of actions, but to a class of reasons. See Pope, supra note 56, at 687, 694.
For a discussion as to why laws that do not limit a subject’s liberty should not be
viewed as paternalistic, see Gerald Dworkin, Defining Paternalism, in
PATERNALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 25, 31–38 (Christian Coons & Michael
Weber eds., 2013).
65
For a further discussion, see Parmet, supra note 16, at 1778.
66
Another problem with labeling a law as paternalistic or not is that the determination depends on the reasons for the law. As Douglas Husak notes, “[b]ut
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very act of labeling a law paternalistic delegitimizes it.67 The label
also obscures the fact that not all restrictions on autonomy are equivalent. Without question, many public health laws, such as quarantines or vaccine mandates, impose significant restrictions on wellestablished liberties.68 Such laws may be justifiable, but they warrant careful consideration regardless of whether the behavior they
restrain is other-regarding or self-regarding.69 Conversely, other
public health laws impose relatively trivial restraints on liberty.
These laws may be less problematic regardless of whether they aim
to protect the individual restrained or someone that individual would
harm.70 As Peter Jacobson explains, “[n]ot every potential limitation
on individual choice rises to the level of an intrusion that compromises individual freedom. For example, banning trans-fats may indeed limit individual choice in using an unhealthy substance, though
the intrusion seems more inconvenient than a serious deprivation of
liberty.”71
The paternalism critique, however, points away from a consideration of the nature and extent of the liberty limited, and to the
question whether the government is acting like the nanny, insisting
on how people should act for their own good. Thus minor inconveniences—having to buy large portions of soda in two servings instead
(especially in a democracy) an attempt to identify the rationale for a law is notoriously problematic . . . .” Douglas Husak, Penal Paternalism, in PATERNALISM:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 39, 41 (Christian Coons & Michael Weber eds., 2013)
(emphasis in original).
67
Christian Coons and Michael Weber note, “Normative debates about paternalism—or at least ‘hard’ paternalism—don’t usually concern whether it is
problematic but rather how problematic it is.” Coons & Weber, supra note 58, at
2 (emphasis in original); see also Mariner supra note 62, at 1824.
68
Wendy E. Parmet, Quarantine Redux: Bioterrorism, AIDS and the Curtailment of Individual Liberty in the Name of Public Health, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 85,
95 (2003).
69
When the liberty restrained rises to the level of a fundamental right, such
laws may trigger strict scrutiny, or at least due process protections, even if they
target other-regarding behavior. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696
F.3d 1205, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (striking down an FDA regulation requiring
graphic warning labels on cigarettes as violating First Amendment protections for
commercial speech), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18,
22–23 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
70
Jacobson, supra note 23, at 222–23.
71
Id.
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of one—are treated as normatively equivalent to significant restrictions of fundamental rights. As a result, the paternalism trope
reflects and reinforces a libertarian perspective that takes atomistic
individuals living in a state of total liberty as its starting point. From
that perspective, any public health regulation, whether or not it satisfies a technical definition of paternalism, and no matter how onerous, demands justification.72 Part II presents the justifications scholars have offered in response.73
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH LAW
In recent years, scholars have developed a rich and wide-ranging
literature in response to the paternalism critique.74 This literature
suggests three broad justifications that, taken together, provide a
framework for ascertaining the normative foundations for public
health laws. Briefly, if any one of the three justifications applies to
a particular public health law, the paternalism critique has been answered with respect to that law. This does not mean the law is wise,
efficacious, or lawful. Other criteria remain relevant to those determinations. The framework simply determines whether the paternalism critique is applicable, and hence whether the infringement of
liberty is prima facie legitimate or illegitimate according to the paternalism critique.
A. Impaired Agency
The defenses of public health laws that highlight informational
deficiencies and the impairment of individual decision-making have
probably been the most influential. Put most simply, the paternalism
critique asserts that competent adults should be able to make their
own decisions on matters affecting their own health. Paternalism,
72

See id. at 221 (discussing the libertarian premises behind the paternalism
critique).
73
The discussion focuses on the justifications that are preeminent in the public health law literature, not in ethics and academic philosophy, in which there is
a rich literature on the justifications, or lack thereof, for paternalism. See GERALD
DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 121–129 (1988); JOEL
FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: VOLUME 2: OFFENSE TO
OTHERS 23–24 (1988); Joel Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Privacy:
Moral Ideals in the Constitution? 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 445, 490–91 (1983).
74
The discussion below is by no means comprehensive.
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however, is generally deemed appropriate for children, or others
who are not legally competent. John Stuart Mill, for example, qualified his condemnation of state interference of self-regarding behavior with the caveat: “We are not speaking of children, or of young
persons below the age which the law may fix as that of manhood or
womanhood.”75 Such views have won the day; it is now widely accepted that states may use their parens patriae power to protect minors, whose agency is assumed to be immature.76 Indeed, to the extent that state laws seeking to protect children’s health are condemned, it is usually because they infringe upon the rights of the
parent, rather than those of the child.77 Accordingly, many public
health laws explicitly related to minors, such as prohibitions on selling them cigarettes or alcohol, arouse little controversy, perhaps because such laws are viewed as abetting the preferences of most parents.78 Moreover, many public health laws that may have a broader
impact, such as limits on cigarette advertising, are often defended
successfully as necessary for the health of children.79
Adults can also suffer from impaired agency. Mill wrote that
“insane persons are everywhere regarded as proper objects of the
75

MILL, supra note 55, at 14. Mill added an additional troubling exception:
“[W]e may leave out of consideration those backward states of society in which
the race itself may be considered as in its nonage.” Id.
76
See Michael S. Merry, Paternalism, Obesity, and Tolerable Levels of Risk,
20 DEMOCRACY & EDUC., no. 1, 2012, at 2.
77
See Kristin Voigt, Childhood Obesity and Restrictions of Parental Liberty:
A Response to “Paternalism, Obesity, and Tolerable Levels of Risk,” 20
DEMOCRACY & EDUC., no. 1, 2012, at 1–2.
78
This suggests that we are more willing to accept infringements on our liberty when we believe they support our ability to realize our choices. See infra text
accompanying note 147. With respect to public health laws aimed at minors, vaccination laws are probably the most contested. Amanda F. Dempsey et al., Alternative Vaccination Schedule Preferences Among Parents of Young Children, 128
PEDIATRICS 848, 849, 852–54 (2011). The objections, however, are usually not
grounded in the paternalism critique. See id. Rather, many opponents believe that
vaccinations are dangerous. Id. (more than 1 out of 10 parents use an alternative
vaccination schedule in part due to concerns about vaccine safety); Gary L. Freed
et al., Parental Vaccine Safety Concerns in 2009, 125 PEDIATRICS 654, 657
(2010).
79
This was one justification offered by the FDA in its defense of the graphic
warning regulations struck down in R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d
1205, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760
F.3d 18, 22–23 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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care of the state,”80 a view that has faced powerful challenges by
advocates for individuals with mental disabilities.81 More relevant
here, addiction can impair an individual’s ability to act in accordance with her preferences, a point used repeatedly to defend the regulation of addictive substances, including cigarettes.82
The impaired agency rationale, however, can be extended beyond the relatively limited cases of immaturity, mental impairment,
or addiction. For example, the decision-making of otherwise competent adults may be impaired if they lack sufficient information
about or understanding of the health risk at issue, either due to informational asymmetries or lack of expertise. To rectify these deficiencies, governments often mandate the disclosure of health-related
information, such as the risks of a medical procedure83 or the calories in a food product. Such laws, which are seldom controversial,
can be viewed as exercises of so-called “soft paternalism,” which
seek to enhance “autonomy by ensuring that the subject’s choices
reflect her true preferences.”84
80
JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY WITH
THE THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 614 (1948).
81

SOME OF

Indeed, the disability rights movement has contested what it claims as inappropriate and discriminatory paternalism against people with disabilities. See,
e.g., JACQUELINE VAUGHN SWITZER, DISABLED RIGHTS: AMERICAN DISABILITY
POLICY AND THE FIGHT FOR EQUALITY 153 (2003); Sarah D. Watson, A Study in
Legislative Strategy: The Passage of the ADA, in IMPLEMENTING THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL AMERICANS 27
(Lawrence O. Gostin & Henry A. Beyer eds., 1993).
82
See Friedman supra note 16, at 1703. Congressional testimony by tobacco
executives denying the addictiveness of nicotine, and evidence that tobacco companies manipulated nicotine contents to enhance addiction, have been credited
with turning public opinion in favor of increased tobacco regulation. See ALLAN
M. BRANDT, THE CIGARETTE CENTURY: THE RISE, FALL, AND DEADLY
PERSISTENCE OF THE PRODUCT THAT DEFINED AMERICA 211 (2007).
83
The argument that disclosure is necessary for the exercise of autonomy has
been clearly stated in court decisions affirming the patient’s right to informed
consent. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t Mental Health, 497 U.S. 261,
269 (1990); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780–81 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
84
Pope, supra note 56, at 671–72. For reasons discussed above, under narrow
definitions, such laws are not paternalistic. See Stephen A. McGuinness, Time to
Cut the Fat: The Case for Government Anti-Obesity Legislation, 25 J.L. &
HEALTH 41, 54 (2012). There is reason, however, for skepticism as to the impact
of factual, text-based disclosures. See Friedman, supra note 16, at 1701–03, 1729–
34.
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Somewhat more controversially, the existence of informational
deficits can also justify regulations that “insulate” individuals from
making harmful choices they would not otherwise make but for
those deficiencies.85 As Thaddeus Mason Pope explains, when an
individual lacks information about the risks of an activity, “it cannot
fairly be said that the individual’s decision was freely or autonomously made because the individual did not fully understand the
dangerous consequences of her behavior.”86 Therefore, restricting
the individual’s liberty does not impinge her autonomy.
In recent years, supporters of public health laws have also
pointed to the existence of cognitive biases and “predictable” irrationalities to demonstrate that decision-making capacity is less rational, and more impaired, than traditional liberal or economic theory presupposes.87 Relying on the findings of behavioral psychology
and economics, legal scholars have noted that rationality is bounded
and that individuals rely on various mental heuristics to process information and make decisions.88 These mental shortcuts and biases
can lead people to over- or underestimate risk and make decisions

85

Informational deficiencies have often been cited as a rationale for administrative action, the theory being that the administrative agency is comprised of
experts with the information that individuals lack. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Expert
Paternalism, 64 FLA. L. REV. 721, 733–36 (2012). For a discussion of so-called
insulating strategies, see David Adam Friedman, Debiasing Advertising: Balancing Risk, Hope, and Social Welfare, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 539, 558 (2011).
86
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Balancing Public Health Against Individual Liberty: The Ethics of Smoking Regulations, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 419, 430 (2000).
87
The term “predictable” is from DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL:
THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 232 (2009). The discussion of
cognitive biases in the legal and public health literature is vast. See, e.g., RICHARD
H. THALER & CASS. R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS passim (2008); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006) (discussing the effects of debiasing through law on a range of legal areas). For a critique of the use
of behavioral economics in public health law, see Mariner, supra note 62, at
1824–26.
88
See Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 64 (2002). For a critique of Sunstein’s omission of cultural biases influencing mental heuristics, see Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071,
1083 (2006) (book review) (focusing on “an important dynamic to which Sunstein
is strikingly inattentive: the impact of cultural worldviews”).
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that fail to accord with their own more fully developed preferences.89
To compensate for cognitive limitations, legal scholars and policymakers have argued that laws can serve an important “debiasing”
function.90 For example, laws requiring graphic warning labels
about dangerous products are sometimes defended as debiasing
measures that utilize the availability heuristic to overcome the optimism bias that leads individuals to underestimate risks.91 Likewise,
Thaler and Sunstein argue that government policies that place
healthy eating options at optimal sites in a school cafeteria are
“nudges” that can compensate for the impact of framing and enable
individuals to select the foods they would want to select if they acted
with greater deliberation and rationality.92 According to Thaler and
Sunstein, such policies constitute a soft form of paternalism, which
they coin “libertarian paternalism,” that helps people do what they
would choose to do if not for their cognitive impairments.93
Not surprisingly, critics have challenged the behavioral economics/impaired agency justification for public health laws. For example, although David Friedman generally accepts that public health
law has a role to play in debiasing, he argues that the most coercive
public health laws (which he characterizes as exercises of hard paternalism) are highly unpopular and frequently lacking in political
legitimacy.94 Other scholars, such as Mario Rizzo and Douglas Glen
Whitman, have questioned whether the discovery of cognitive bi-

89

Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 87, at 204–05.
Id. at 206. For several examples of laws serving a debiasing function see
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1504, 1527, 1544 (1998).
91
Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 87, at 212–15.
92
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 87, at 1–4, 10–11.
93
Id. at 4–6. The term “soft paternalism” is used differently by different commentators. Some use the term to refer to laws that respond to impaired agency.
See N.Y. Ng & J.P. Ruger, Ethics and Social Value Judgments in Public Health,
1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HEALTH ECON. 287, 289 (2014). Others use it to denote
measures to enhance “autonomy by ensuring that the subject’s choices reflect her
true preferences.” Pope, supra note 56, at 672. Still others use it to refer to laws
that are less coercive and leave individuals with choices. See THALER &
SUNSTEIN, supra note 87, at 5–6.
94
Friedman, supra note 16, at 1753.
90

900

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:879

ases justifies regulations by policymakers who are themselves susceptible to irrationalities.95 They also worry that the acceptance of
cognitive biases as a justification for regulation creates a slippery
slope, opening the door for a wide array of paternalistic interventions.96
For present purposes, it is not essential to review all of the critiques offered of the behavioral economics approach. Instead, three
points warrant consideration. First, by claiming that laws relating to
self-regarding behaviors should respect individual preferences except when agency is impaired, the behavioral economics/impaired
agency justification largely accepts the libertarian assumptions implicit in the paternalism critique. Indeed, supporters of the behavioral economics/impaired agency approach frame their project as
one aimed at empowering individual choice.97 Second, by conceding that public health laws targeting NCDs are paternalistic, advocates of the behavioral economics/impaired agency justification
overlook the support for such laws offered by a population perspective.98 Still, by explaining how cognitive biases interact with social
factors to frame and distort choices, the justification points to the
critical role that social and environmental factors play in determining behaviors that affect health. This third point suggests a far
broader and more robust justification for public health laws than
supporters of behavioral economics generally acknowledge.

95

See Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, Little Brother is Watching
You: New Paternalism on the Slippery Slopes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 685, 723–35
(2009). But see Blumenthal, supra note 85, at 725. Jennifer S. Blumenthal-Barby
also questions whether the regulator who tries to “nudge” subjects can in fact
know the subjects’ preferences. See J. S. Blumenthal-Barby, Choice Architecture:
A Mechanism for Improving Decisions While Preserving Liberty?, in
PATERNALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE 178, 179, 183, 196 (Christian Coons &
Michael Weber eds., 2013).
96
See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
1, 5, 66–69 (2007).
97
See Russell Korobkin, Libertarian Welfarism, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1651,
1652 (2009); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is
Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1201 (2003) (describing libertarian
paternalism as “an approach that preserves freedom of choice”).
98
See infra text accompanying notes 116–148.
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B. The Harm Principle: A Population Perspective
No one questions that the state is justified in protecting individuals from harms caused by others.99 Laws against homicide or drunk
driving are commonly accepted without debate as appropriate limits
on an individual’s ability to harm another.100 Likewise, even the
most ardent critics of public health law concede that the state has a
legitimate interest in seeking to prevent public nuisances, communicable diseases, and other harms that constitute public bads.101 In all
such cases, state action is directed not at self-regarding behaviors,
but at behaviors thought to have a deleterious impact on others. Such
regulations, by definition, are not paternalistic.
The broad acceptance of the harm principle raises a critical question for laws targeting NCDs.102 Under which circumstances are
such laws justified by the harm principle? Are they paternalistic regulations of individuals, or limits on other-regarding actions? Public
health advocates and scholars have offered many arguments to support the latter conclusion. Three types of arguments are especially
prominent.
The first relies on a straightforward application of the harm principle by demonstrating that the particular actions of individuals or
corporations are the proximate cause of NCDs in others.103 For example, indoor air regulations have been explained as necessary to
protect bystanders from the harms of other individuals’ secondhand
smoke.104 So viewed, indoor air regulations seem relatively similar
to the communicable disease laws, such as quarantine, that characterized the old public health: Both limit individual liberty to prevent
harm to others.

99

Even Mill conceded this. See Mill, supra note 55, at 13. Even if they are
not paternalistic, laws may be inappropriate for other reasons. For example, a law
imposing the death penalty for speeding is not paternalistic, but it is still of dubious legitimacy, not to mention constitutionality.
100
Laws protecting individuals from harm from others may still be ineffective
or cause more harm than good. They may also violate other deeply held principles,
including respect for freedom of speech or religion.
101
E.g., Epstein, supra note 41, at 1425–26.
102
Wiley, Berman & Blanke, supra note 24, at 89.
103
To be sure, different products pose dramatically different degrees of risk,
a point whose significance is discussed infra text accompanying notes 182–187.
104
Pope, supra note 86, at 441.

902

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:879

Critics of laws relating to NCDs often portray the so-called old
public health through an overly rosy lens. In reality, the good old
days weren’t always so good. Communicable disease laws often
subjected vulnerable individuals to highly coercive and often ineffective legal measures such as isolation or mandatory sterilization,
on the frequently erroneous belief that they endangered the health of
others.105 All too often these laws reflected and reified the troubling
association between disease and marginalized communities.106
Justifications for NCD laws that rely on the claim that the actions of individuals endanger others create similar risks. Indeed,
many of the laws proposed or enacted for reducing smoking or obesity rates reinforce stigmas and disproportionately disadvantage vulnerable populations.107 For example, laws that limit the foods that
can be purchased with food stamps stigmatize low-income individuals by treating them as less capable than others of making healthy
dietary choices. In this way, an overly simplistic reliance on the
harm principle may reinforce inequities and disparities,108 highlighting the critical but often overlooked point that even when a public
health law may be justified under the harm principle, other considerations may point to its inappropriateness.109
A second type of argument based upon the harm principle follows from public health’s utilitarian and consequentialist tradition
by focusing on the aggregate health and economic costs of NCDs

105
See Wendy E. Parmet, Dangerous Perspectives: The Perils of Individualizing Public Health Problems, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 83, 83–84 (2009).
106
Id. at 104.
107
Id.; See also Ronald Bayer & Jennifer Stuber, Tobacco Control, Stigma,
and Public Health: Rethinking the Relations, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 47, 47
(2006); Kirsten Bell et al., Smoking, Stigma and Tobacco ‘Denormalization’: Further Reflections on the Use of Stigma as a Public Health Tool. A Commentary on
Social Science & Medicine’s Stigma, Prejudice, Discrimination and Health Special Issue, 70 SOC. SCI. & MED. 795, 797 (2010); Janet L. Dolgin & Katherine R.
Dieterich, Weighing Status: Obesity, Class, and Health Reform, 89 OR. L. REV.
1113, 1139 (2011); Ng & Ruger, supra note 93, at 290.
108
Wiley, supra note 32, at 77–79.
109
Sometimes a frankly paternalistic approach, in which the government admits to wanting to help the objects of a law, may be less stigmatizing and certainly
less oppressive than a law that regulates vulnerable individuals as if they represented a threat to others.
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and similar health threats.110 For example, motorcycle helmet and
seatbelt laws have often been accepted as a means of saving taxpayers from the costs of treating accident victims.111 Likewise, public
health advocates have pointed to the aggregate health effects (including the prospect of reduced longevity) and high medical costs
as justifications for legal interventions aimed at obesity. Lawrence
Gostin has argued:
Obesity primarily affects the individual, but it also
has high socioeconomic costs. The aggregate consequences of individual choices are countless preventable disabilities and deaths, affecting families and the
entire community. Obesity-attributable medical expenditures reached $75 billion in the United States in
2003, with substantial additional indirect costs in lost
productivity . . . . The government arguably has a legitimate interest in controlling medical and social
costs of individuals’ unhealthy behaviors that are
borne by society at large.112
Not surprisingly, public health law critics have not been persuaded by such arguments. First, they challenge the underlying empirical claims, noting that prevention has only rarely been shown to
save money. Jonny Anomaly, for example, points out that because
smoking and obesity shorten life expectancy, they may actually reduce overall health care costs.113
110

See generally Lawrence O. Gostin et al., The Law and the Public’s Health:
A Study of Infectious Disease Law in the United States, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 59,
63–64 (1999). A similar justification has been used successfully to defend helmet
and seatbelt laws. See Pope, supra note 86, at 443–44.
111
Gostin, supra note 110, at 73, 100, 122.
112
Lawrence O. Gostin, Law as a Tool to Facilitate Healthier Lifestyles and
Prevent Obesity, 297 JAMA 87, 87 (2007).
113
Jonny Anomaly, Is Obesity A Public Health Problem?, 5 PUB. HEALTH
ETHICS 216, 218 (2012). Tobacco companies have made similar arguments in defending tort claims. See, e.g., Matthew R. Herington, Tobacco Regulation in the
United States: New Opportunities and Challenges, 23 HEALTH LAW. 13, 13
(2010). Critics have also pointed to conflicting studies in the scientific literature
regarding the mortality impact of obesity. See Smokers and the Obese Cheaper to
Care For, Study Shows, N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 5, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/05/health/05iht-obese.1.9748884.html?_r=0.
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A second more conceptual criticism claims that aggregate costs
arise from health problems such as obesity only because we have
chosen to socialize health care costs. Epstein writes, “[b]ut here it is
the social response, not the underlying set of choices, that introduces
a public goods dimension into the mix. The problem could be reduced or eliminated by reversing the antecedent decision to socialize
the expenses of health care through programs like Medicare and
Medicaid.”114
To Epstein, the cost argument is a form of bootstrapping that
relies on the socialization of health care costs to justify the public
interest in protecting health. Yet while Epstein is correct that obesity
would not create the same costs to taxpayers if we did not redistribute health care costs, his argument relies on a world in which no
health care costs are socialized and ill health creates no externalities.
In reality, health care costs are redistributed to varying degrees in
all nations because untreated health conditions create significant externalities that extend outside of the cost of health care and could
not be avoided even if no health care costs were redistributed. Most
obvious in the case of preventable infectious diseases, this also applies to NCDs. Consider a single mother with untreated diabetes
who cannot afford treatment. Even if taxpayers failed to pay any of
the costs of her health care, the public would end up bearing some
costs of her disease by way of her reduced productivity, or the state’s
need to care for her children if she died prematurely.115 In short, although health has many attributes of a private good, and the market
can be used to influence its distribution, it also has numerous aspects
of a public good.116 All externalities cannot be eliminated simply by
114

Epstein, supra note 47, at 1369.
Some libertarians might respond that the state should not care for her children; but few serious thinkers would argue that we should leave orphaned children
to the fate they suffered in Dickens’ novels.
116
The economic definition of a public good is one which is nonexcludable
and nonrivalrous. Patricia Illingworth & Wendy E. Parmet, Solidarity and Health:
A Public Goods Justification, 43 DIAMETROS 65, 66 (2015). Health is generally
nonrivalrous in that one person’s health does not diminish another’s (to the contrary, it can enhance another’s). Id. However, many of the so-called access goods
that help support health, especially medical services, are excludable. Id. at 67. But
with a broader public health perspective, health appears to take on more characteristics of a public good in that its absence has broad externalities; moreover, its
existence depends significantly on nonexcludable access goods, such as social determinants. See id. at 67–68.
115
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abolishing private or public health insurance. This gives the government an inherent economic stake in preventing NCDs, although the
strength of the state’s interest may vary depending upon the underlying empirical facts.
The claim that health has more attributes of a public good than
libertarians acknowledge underlies the third type of argument that
public health advocates use to place laws targeting NCDs under the
harm principle. This argument relies on public health’s own population perspective, which emphasizes the role that population-level
(non-individual) factors play in determining population-level health
outcomes.117 From the population perspective, NCDs are less the result of individual preferences and behaviors and more the sequelae
of a thick web of social factors, often coined “the social determinants of health.”118 Thus, public health researchers and advocates
have noted that a wide range of government policies, marketing
practices, and social norms have coalesced to create what some have
called an obesogenic environment,119 which is uncondusive to physical activity, abundant with fast food, and devoid of health options.
This toxic environment exudes the same type of externalities found
in the public nuisances targeted by the old public health.120
The fact that obesity and other NCDs are determined at a population level by social factors suggests a further point. If health conditions are affected by population-level factors, the health and
health-affecting behaviors of individuals can impact the health of
117
See PARMET, supra note 20, at 13–22; see also Micah L. Berman, A Public
Health Perspective on Health Care Reform, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 353, 360 (2011).
118
Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53
EMORY L.J. 1645, 1664–84 (2004). The term “social determinants” is often used
to refer to the wide range of social factors that influence population health. See,
e.g., Michael Marmot et al., Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equality
Through Action on the Social Determinants of Health, 372 LANCET 1661, 1661
(2008).
119
See Boyd Swinburn et al., Dissecting Obesogenic Environments: The Development and Application of a Framework for Identifying and Prioritizing Environmental Interventions for Obesity, 29 PREVENTIVE MED. 563, 566–68 (1999).
120
See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin & Maxwell Gregg Bloche, The Politics of
Public Health: A Response to Epstein, 46 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. S160, S172
(2003); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, The Public’s Right to Health: When Patient
Rights Threaten the Commons, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1335, 1391–92 (2009); Lindsay F. Wiley, Rethinking the New Public Health, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 207,
267 (2012).
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others. This is most apparent in the case of cigarette smoking. Not
only may an individual’s decision to smoke create proximal harm to
others through secondhand smoke, it may also help normalize smoking, reinforcing an environment that induces others to smoke.121
Likewise, researchers have found network effects with respect to
obesity, suggesting that the diet and exercise decisions of individuals have spillover effects on others within their social network.122
This suggests that laws regulating NCDs may be justified by the
harm principle because health is largely determined at a population
level.
To critics, the recognition that health is determined as much or
more by social factors as individual decisions is deeply troubling.
As Adam Benforado and colleagues have explained, we are predisposed to believe that we have more individual agency than we
have.123 We deeply want to believe we can control our fate, and that
our actions are the result of our own reasoned choices rather than
the environment we inhabit.124 Moreover, as Mark Rothstein has argued, public health’s population perspective may justify a remarkably broad range of state interventions.125 This is troubling precisely
because public health laws may overreach and trump other important values, as they often did in the days of the old public health.
Thus, as noted above, Mark Hall seeks to cabin public health laws
to those relating to communicable diseases even while recognizing
that public health science cannot be so limited.126 Yet by relying on
an overly simplistic distinction between infectious diseases and
NCDs to limit public health laws’ reach, this approach risks diverting our attention from the potential overreach of infectious disease
laws127 as well as other normative limits on laws addressing

121

See Jennifer O’Loughlin et al., Determinants of First Puff and Daily Cigarette Smoking in Adolescents, 170 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 585, 588 (2009).
122
See Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in
a Large Social Network over 32 Years, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 370 (2007).
123
Benforado et al., supra note 118, at 1661.
124
Id.
125
Rothstein, supra note 44, at 148–49.
126
Hall, supra note 44, at S202.
127
In his writings about communicable disease laws Rothstein has articulated
important principles for limiting the reach of infectious disease laws. See Mark A.
Rothstein, The Moral Challenge of Ebola, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 6, 6–7 (2015);
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NCDs.128 Thus, this view permits an overly narrow but excessively
powerful role for public health law.
Underlying the acceptability of the various arguments and counterarguments waged within the confines of the harm principle are
serveral critical questions: How readily do we see harm to others?
And how strong must the harm to others be before we see a law as
resting within the harm principle? Do we view the decision to use ecigarettes as simply fulfilling the endogenous preference of the
vaper, or do we see it as a function of a web of social factors? Likewise, do we consider only the proximal harm that comes to bystanders from vaping, or do we look more broadly at the impact of vaping
on population health? In other words, what factors do we deem material? What perspective do we hold? The research on social determinants and NCDs suggests that if we care about health, our perspective must indeed be broad.
That recognition, however, does not mean all health threats, infectious or not, merit all plausible legal responses. The magnitude
of the harm to be prevented matters. Moreover, if we take a public
health perspective seriously, so does the state of the empirical evidence. Without empirical evidence indicating that a particular action
harms population health, its regulation cannot be justified on the basis of the harm principle, a point that becomes especially salient in
the case of e-cigarettes, the health effects of which remain unclear.
C. Self-Governance
In recent years, public health law scholars have articulated a
third important justification for laws targeting NCDs: Such laws

see also Mark A. Rothstein, Ebola, Quarantine, and the Law, 45 HASTINGS CTR.
REP. 5, 5–6 (2015).
128
See infra text accompanying notes 176–187.

908

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:879

may represent a manifestation of a population’s liberty to take collective action to protect its health via self-governance.129 This justification, with roots in civic republicanism,130 as well as social contract theory,131 provides a robust defense of many public health laws,
but it also implies critical limitations.
The self-governance argument depends upon three claims. The
first is that health is a prerequisite to positive liberty,132 worthy of
special moral importance and legal respect. In effect, health is not
simply another good, but one necessary to enable individuals to exercise their other liberties, or attain their personal goals.133 According to Sridhar Venkatapuram, because “a person’s health is an assessment of her abilities to be and do some basic things,” health is a
“metacapability.”134 Other theorists agree health has a special moral
importance because of its critical role in enabling individuals to exercise their agency and fulfill other life choices.135
Second, because health is largely a public good, and is at least
partially determined at a population level, individuals cannot secure
their health on their own. Rather, to varied degrees, health requires
collective action. For example, individuals are relatively limited in
their ability to protect themselves against many infectious diseases
129

E.g., Lazzarini & Gregorio, supra note 21, at 1855; Wiley et al., supra note
24, at 91.
130
Bruce Jennings, Public Health and Civic Republicanism: Toward an Alternative Framework for Public Health Ethics, in ETHICS, PREVENTION AND
PUBLIC HEALTH 30, 31–34 (Angus Dawson & Marcel Verweij eds., 2007).
131
Wendy E. Parmet, Health Care and the Constitution: Public Health and
the Role of the State in the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 316–19
(1993).
132
“Positive liberty is the possibility of acting—or the fact of acting—in such
a way as to take control of one’s life and realize one’s fundamental purposes.” Ian
Carter, Positive and Negative Liberty, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2016), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/liberty-positive-negative/.
133
The persuasiveness of this argument depends upon defining health relatively narrowly. If health is defined too broadly it loses its priority among other
goods. For a discussion of the possible definitions of health and their relationship
to the understanding of health as a metacapability, see VENKATAPURAM, supra
note 23, at 44–72.
134
Id. at 20.
135
See NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH: MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY
17–21 (2008); see also MADISON POWERS & RUTH FADEN, SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE
MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC HEALTH AND HEALTH POLICY 85 (2006).
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prevalent in a community. Nor can individuals protect themselves
from the health effects of air pollution, traffic hazards, unwholesome water, or a wide range of social determinants. Less obviously,
smokers who want to quit smoking may have much less success if
they live in a community in which smoking is ubiquitous. And those
who want to lose weight may find it hard to do so if they live in food
deserts. In all these cases and many more, individual health can be
best, and sometimes only, secured through collective action that alters the environment.
The collective actions that protect health and therefore support
positive liberty often require that other liberties be restrained. As the
Supreme Court recognized in upholding a Massachusetts law mandating smallpox vaccination, “[r]eal liberty for all could not exist
under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each
individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or
his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others.”136
The Court thus affirmed that liberty not only exists in the absence of
state action; state action may at times be necessary to ensure liberty.137
Third, in a democratic polity, public health laws can be the fruit
of a population’s exercise of its own political liberty. According to
the Institute of Medicine, “[p]ublic health is what we, as a society,
do collectively to assure the conditions for people to be healthy.”138
Or as Marcel Verweij and Angus Dawson explain, public health
consists of the “collective interventions that aim to promote and protect the health of the public.”139 In effect, public health laws are a
136

Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).
Bruce Jennings argues that public health interventions “inherently” involve
state action. Bruce Jennings, Relational Liberty Revisited: Membership, Solidarity and a Public Health Ethics of Place, 8 PUB. HEALTH ETHICS 7, 7 (2015). This
seems somewhat of an overstatement, as private individuals operating in concert
can undertake interventions that promote their health, as is evident by the actions
undertaken by AIDS support groups early in the epidemic. See RAYMOND A.
SMITH & PATRICIA D. SIPLON, DRUGS INTO BODIES: GLOBAL AIDS TREATMENT
ACTIVISM 15 (2006).
138
COMM. FOR THE STUDY OF THE FUTURE OF PUB. HEALTH, INST. OF MED.,
supra note 25, at 19.
139
Marcel Verweij & Angus Dawson, The Meaning of ‘Public’ in ‘Public
Health’, in ETHICS, PREVENTION AND PUBLIC HEALTH 14, 21 (Angus Dawson &
Marcel Verweij eds., 2007).
137
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primary mechanism by which individuals, acting within populations, engage their political right to secure their health, which, as
noted above, is a prerequisite to the exercise of their other liberties.140
This engagement of populations around the shared goal of public
health can and should be understood as an act of solidarity, enhanced
by the recognition of the mutual dependency that arises from populations’ shared vulnerability to disease and injury.141 Critically, such
solidaristic actions are both exemplars and constituents of self-governance. In effect, recognition of shared vulnerability to health problems, be they infectious diseases, environmental toxins, or NCDs,
brings people together to engage their political system. They decide
upon the levels of risk they are willing to tolerate, the trade-offs they
are willing to make, and the robustness of the evidence they will
demand. Exercising their political liberty to make these choices,
they seek and enact laws to protect their mutual health, as AIDS activists did in the 1980s and 1990s, and as anti-tobacco groups have
done for decades.142 As Bruce Jennings explains, “[a]n aggregation

140

The extent to which laws are necessary for fulfilling the liberty of health
depends on the degree to which health requires collective action—in other words,
the extent to which health is a public good. Illingworth & Parmet, supra note 116,
at 67–69. As noted above, from a public health perspective, health appears to be
a public good. Id. at 66. But even if health is not a public good, public health laws
have significant public good attributes in that they provide individuals and populations with benefits that would be far more costly if not impossible to attain on
their own. This is perhaps most obvious with vaccine laws that help establish socalled herd immunity, allowing individuals who are unable to be vaccinated, or
for whom vaccines don’t work, to escape the dangers of vaccine-preventable diseases by stopping the spread of infection within a community. Lawrence O. Gostin, Law, Ethics and Public Health in the Vaccination Debates: Politics of the
Measles Outbreak, 313 JAMA 1099, 1099 (2015). But laws targeting NCDs can
also enable individuals to reap health benefits difficult to attain on their own.
Illingworth & Parmet, supra note 116, at 68. For example, although many individuals can stop smoking without them, such laws may make it far easier for people addicted to nicotine to avoid the temptation of succumbing to their habit. Id.
141
See Illingworth & Parmet, supra note 116, at 68–69; Jennings, supra note
137, at 12–14; Barbara Prainsack & Alena Buyx, Solidarity in Contemporary Bioethics – Towards a New Approach, 26 BIOETHICS 343, 347 (2012).
142
See, e.g., SMITH & SIPLON, supra note 137, at 14–34 (discussing the rise of
AIDS activism and its impact on U.S. policy); Elizabeth Laposata et al., When
Tobacco Targets Direct Democracy, 39 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y. & L. 537–40
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of individuals becomes a people, a public, a political community
when it is capable of recognizing common purposes and problems
in this way . . . .”143
As the legal embodiment of populations’ political engagement,
public health law can be understood as the product of self-governance.144 Although similar arguments can be made for other types of
laws, this understanding of public health laws gains special traction
because health is a metacapability and a public good largely determined at a population level. Health is, therefore, different from
many other goods subject to the political system precisely because
it is a prerequisite to positive liberty, and because it can be secured
only by collective action. Indeed, health exposes our mutual vulnerability and demonstrates unequivocally the extent to which the good
of individuals is dependent upon the environment in which they live
and the laws they authorize to shape that environment.145 Especially
when epidemics threaten, the positive liberty of self-governance is
essential to securing the positive liberty of health. For this reason,
public health laws can also be understood as part of the founding
motivation for the social contract.146 As John Locke stated, people
agree to be governed precisely “for the mutual Preservation of their
Lives, Liberties and Estates, which [Locke called] by the general
Name, Property.”147 Without public health laws, people’s lives and
(2014) (discussing the use of forms of direct democracy by grassroots anti-tobacco groups).
143
Jennings, supra note 130, at 48.
144
The concept of self-governance has a long pedigree within civic republicanism, see, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term–Foreword:
Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 17–19 (1986); James Gray
Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American
Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 296 (1990), and First Amendment
theory, see, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 75 (1965) (stating that the First
Amendment exists “to give to every voting member of the body politic the fullest
possible participation in the understanding of those problems with which the citizens of a self-governing society must deal.”).
145
This is most obvious in the case of communicable diseases, but individuals
are also unable, on their own, to control the social determinants of health. Nor can
anyone be wholly self-sufficient when ill. See supra text accompanying notes
118–23.
146
Parmet, supra note 131, at 312.
147
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 350 (Peter Laslett ed.,
1988) (1689).

912

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:879

liberties are as insecure as they would be if the government failed to
protect them from foreign foes.
Once public health laws are viewed in this light, the paternalism
critique, which looks only at the restraint of an individual’s negative
liberty, seems misplaced. Rather than as mere restraints upon liberty, public health laws now appear to be mechanisms by which positive liberty is both exercised and enhanced.148 Hence the presumption of illegitimacy implied by the paternalism critique threatens to
diminish liberty, undermine health, and weaken self-governance,
leaving “we the people” without important tools for improving our
health.
This perspective has important doctrinal implications. Most critically it suggests that public health laws should (at least when they
are exercises of self-governance) be granted the presumption of constitutionality normally accorded to acts of the political branches,149
rather than being viewed, as the paternalism critique implies, as presumptively illegitimate. Indeed, once we see public health laws as
exercises of self-governance, judicially imposed restraints on paternalism, especially when unmoored from clearly established constitutional rights or statutory limitations, are exposed as countermajoritarian efforts to limit liberty while imposing a libertarian perspective on the body politic. In other words, the paternalistic critique
“[re]enact[s] Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”150
This is not to say the self-governance rationale justifies all public
health laws. To the contrary, the justification proffers its own important limits. Most critically, the recognition of public laws as manifestations of self-governance places upon public health laws all the
typical limits imposed upon the state by liberal theory.151 Hence, the
148

Dawson & Verweij, supra note 43, at 2.
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). This
argument is similar to one that First Amendment scholars have recently made regarding the impact of the Supreme Court’s absolutist interpretation of the First
Amendment on self-governance. See Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam
Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 165, 165–67, 172 (2015); see
generally Rebecca L. Brown, The Harm Principle and Free Speech (U.S.C.
GOULD LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPERS SERIES NO. 15-11 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2584080.
150
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
151
John Coggon argues that the normative foundations for public health essentially conflate with those that underlie liberal political theory. JOHN COGGON,
149
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primary limitations on public health laws are to be found within the
confines of the rule of law and the recognition of individual rights.
Thus norms of due process and respect for individual rights, such as
those protected by the Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment,
remain as critical checks on public health powers.152 Further, the
most trenchant critiques of public health laws derive not from their
paternalistic nature, but from the failings of our polity to adhere to
its democratic principles and facilitate self-governance.153 This,
however, is not a problem unique to public health laws, or even to
the new public health.
The self-governance rationale, however, also contains within it
additional caveats that, while applicable to other types of laws, are
especially salient to public health laws. The first arises from the diverse and contingent nature of populations. Public health law’s population perspective recognizes a multiplicity of ever-shifting populations.154 In reality there is no one public. There are many publics
comprising different populations that face different health risks and
bear different burdens from public health laws.
The multiplicity and differential position of varied populations
counsel against presuming that any specific public health law can be
justified as the expression of any particular population’s exercise of
self-governance. It also requires us to remember that public health
laws are often the restraints on liberty that one population imposes
on another, often less powerful, population, as the fear of disease
often incites the tendency to scapegoat those already vulnerable.155
WHAT MAKES HEALTH PUBLIC? A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF MORAL, LEGAL,
AND POLITICAL CLAIMS IN PUBLIC HEALTH 205–34 (2012).
152
See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY,
RESTRAINT 113–44 (rev. 2d ed. 2008) (discussing the constitutional limits on public health powers).
153
See Lani Guinier, Beyond Electocracy: Rethinking the Political Representative as Powerful Stranger, 71 MOD. L. REV. 1, 20–22 (2008).
154
PARMET, supra note 20, at 54. The self-governance argument has roots in
the communitarian as well as civic republican traditions. Id. at 1, 13–14. However,
the recognition of the contingent nature of populations suggests a critical distinction from traditional communitarianism. See id. at 18. Populations are not necessarily fixed demographic or geographic communities. See id.
155
This was and remains a common characteristic of the old public health
laws. See, e.g., Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103 F. 10, 26 (N.D. Cal. 1900) (finding
unconstitutional a quarantine of the Chinese community in San Francisco). For a
longer discussion, see Parmet, supra note 34, at 64–71.
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This underscores that public health laws must adhere to norms of
equality, and that the self-governance justification applies only
when populations restrain their own liberty, not when they impose
the costs of health onto others.156
Second, the self-governance justification depends upon a degree
of political engagement and popular rooting for public health laws
that is often lacking. This is not because public health laws are generally unpopular. Even many paternalistic public health laws enjoy
more public support than the paternalism critique presupposes.157
Still, public acceptance of a law does not alone constitute the type
of active citizen engagement that underpins the self-governance justification.158 Perhaps, for that reason, public health scholars have exhorted public health practitioners “to engage with people at the
grassroots level.”159 When public health laws emerge from grassroots activism, there is a far stronger basis for claiming that they are
acts of self-governance than when affected populations have not
mobilized for the laws.
The importance of grassroots involvement may help explain the
leading role localities have played in developing public health law
innovations.160 As Paul Diller has documented, many of the most
notable innovations in laws relating to both tobacco and obesity
156

Michael Walzer similarly argues that although communities should be able
to self-govern, they should not be able to impose laws on those not accorded membership within their community. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 61–63 (1983).
157
See Parmet, supra note 16, at 1787. Many public health laws that initially
face strong public resistance become popular over time. See id.
158
Exactly what type of popular engagement constitutes adequate support for
a public health law in a complex society is a fundamental question for democratic
theory beyond the scope of this paper. For present purposes, I simply claim that
to the extent the justification for a public health law rests upon self-governance,
the law should plausibly be the product of self-governance.
159
Jennings, supra note 130, at 34; Wiley, Berman & Blanke, supra note 24,
at 90 (arguing that we need to “think[] about how we can come together as a
community to address [public health problems].”).
160
There are also constitutional reasons for viewing public health law as primarily state and local law. See GOSTIN supra note 152, at 92 (discussing the police
power). Although related to the theory of federalism, this argument does not depend on the fact that the Constitution leaves the police power to the states. Rather,
the point is that the self-governance claim is more persuasive in smaller jurisdictions in which citizen groups can have greater influence.
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have emerged in cities.161 Diller attributes this in part to the more
liberal predilections of urban residents.162 Regardless, it remains relevant that affected populations are also closer to the lawmaking bodies at the local level,163 while industry groups may have less influence there for a variety of reasons.164 All things being equal, community engagement is more apt to be present and influential at the
local level.165
A similar issue relates to the fact that public health law is largely
administrative law.166 Most public health laws are not enacted by
legislatures, but promulgated by administrative bodies at the local,
state, and federal levels.167 If we are to respect the positive liberty of

161

See generally Paul A. Diller, Why Do Cities Innovate in Public Health?
Implications of Scale and Structure, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1219 (2014) (discussing
cities’ public health regulation); see also Kathleen Hoke Dachille, Using Law to
Improve Public Health: The Example of Tobacco Regulation, 17 N.Y. ST. B.
ASS’N HEALTH L.J. 32, 32 (2012) (“History and current experience show that fundamental changes in public health regulation in the United States often start at the
local level; this is particularly true with respect to tobacco control.”).
162
Diller, supra note 161, at 1281. Katherine Pratt also argues that health officials may be more nimble at the local level. Katherine Pratt, Lessons from the
Demise of the Sugary Drink Portion Cap Rule, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 39,
71 (2015).
163
There is also reason to believe that state legislatures are more susceptible
to “capture” by industries that manufacture products associated with NCDs. See
Michael S. Givel & Stanton A. Glantz, Tobacco Lobby Political Influence on US
State Legislatures in the 1990s, 10 TOBACCO CONTROL 124, 124–25 (2001) (“The
[tobacco] industry’s public policy objective has been to preserve and expand its
customer base, sales, and profits through sophisticated lobbying and political efforts in state legislatures . . . . These policy objectives and approaches have led to
and are also connected to collective state legislative outputs or governmental actions relating to tobacco control legislation and programmes, including enactment
of state laws preempting local clean indoor air and other tobacco control ordinances and keeping state tobacco excise taxes low.”).
164
See Paul Diller, Local Health Agencies, The Bloomberg Soda Rule, and the
Ghost of Woodrow Wilson, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1859, 1886 (2013).
165
Matthew J. Parlow, Civic Republicanism, Public Choice Theory, and
Neighborhood Councils: A New Model for Civic Engagement, 79 UNIV. COLO. L.
REV. 137, 153–57 (2008).
166
See Edward P. Richards, Public Health Law as Administrative Law: Example Lessons, 10 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 61 (2007).
167
For a discussion of local administrative rulemaking and innovation with
respect to public health see Diller, supra note 164, at 1884–1900.
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populations to protect their own health, we need to accept their ability to rely on experts to implement their wishes.168 As Oren Bar-Gill
and Cass Sunstein have argued, administrative agencies can be
viewed as the public’s agents—as entities that enhance rather than
restrain liberty.169 This is especially the case during epidemics. Indeed, the history of public health demonstrates that boards of health
evolved in response to cholera epidemics, in which populations
came to recognize the need for powerful expert bodies that could
quickly respond to the calamity at hand.170 But even with respect to
NCDs, a population may still need to rely upon an administrative
body to achieve its desired degree of health protection. For example,
it is difficult to think of how populations could adequately protect
themselves against dangerous pharmaceuticals without an entity
similar to the FDA. Likewise, a population that worries about obesity may want administrative agencies to use their expertise to implement policies to make the environment less obesogenic. Moreover, epidemics often arise suddenly and require the type of rapid response that only standing administrative agencies can supply. If epidemics could be addressed only when the public mobilized, public
health would be sorely compromised.
Still, the self-governance justification for public health laws offers an important caution for such regulations arising from administrative action, especially in the absence of clear legislative guidance.
If self-governance is a critical rationale for public health laws (when
no other rationale suffices), the actuality of self-governance needs
to be taken seriously. This suggests that when neither the impaired
agency rationale nor harm principle applies, public health agencies
must be careful to respect the choices of the democratically elected
branches (which represent the self-governed) as to priorities, the
population’s willingness to bear risks, and the degree of evidence it
168

See Blumenthal, supra note 85, at 728 (explaining why individuals may
prefer to have experts make decisions for them).
169
Oren Bar-Gill & Cass R. Sunstein, Regulation as Delegation, 7 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 1, 15 (2015).
170
For example, the first standing board of health in the United States was
appointed during a cholera outbreak. CHARLES E. ROSENBERG, THE CHOLERA
YEARS: THE UNITED STATES IN 1832, 1849, AND 1866, at 19 (Univ. of Chicago
Press 3d ed. 1971). Previously, New York and other jurisdictions appointed
boards of health and vested them with broad power during epidemics, only to
allow the board to disband once the crisis had passed. Id.
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demands. No simple imperative to promote health in the absence of
clear evidence should prevail unless there is good reason to believe
the affected population has chosen it. For this reason, health agencies should be wary about getting too far ahead of the populations
they claim to protect by using standing grants of broad authority in
novel ways.171 The ready use of emergency powers, which grant
public health agencies broad authority to relax otherwise existing
legal processes and rights, is especially problematic in the absence
of firm evidence of imminent harm to others.172
The need for public health agencies to consider the popular foundation for their regulations is perhaps one lesson from the Supreme
Court’s decision in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation, in which it rejected the FDA’s assertion of jurisdiction over
tobacco on the theory that Congress did not intend for the agency to
regulate tobacco.173 Although the Court’s opinion was troubling for
its failure to accept the potency of the impaired agency and harm
principle rationales, the Court correctly recognized that the FDA’s
regulations went beyond the scope that the political branches intended when the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act was enacted.174
Likewise, the New York Court of Appeals’ decision to invalidate
the New York City Board of Health’s sugary soda portion rule in
New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce
v. New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene can be
understood as an attempt to confine the Board’s rulemaking in the
absence of clear legislative authority when “the connection of the
regulation with the preservation of health and safety is [not] very
direct . . . .”175 Although these decisions are problematic for their
171

See Peter D. Jacobson & Wendy E. Parmet, Defending Public Health Regulations: The Message Is the Medium, 44 HASTINGS CTR. RPT. 4, 4–5 (2014).
172
See Rebecca Haffajee et al., What is a Public Health “Emergency”?, 371
NEW ENG. J. MED. 986, 986–88 (2014).
173
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 (2000). It
should, however, be noted that the impaired agency rationale was relatively robust
as applied to the regulations at issue in FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., given that the FDA was focused on regulating the marketing of cigarettes
to youth, and that cigarettes are addictive. See id. at 127–28.
174
Id. at 143–56.
175
N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t
of Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538, 548 (N.Y. 2014). The court in effect
limited the scope of the Board’s policymaking in cases in which individual autonomy was at stake and the harm to others was indirect. In applying this approach
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failure to adopt a population perspective and recognize the strength
of the impaired agency and harm principle justifications, they serve
as useful reminders that self-governance provides not only a justification but also a limit on public health law.
D. Constraints on Public Health Law
To summarize the argument thus far, the public health law literature offers three broad responses to the paternalism critique. The
first two, impaired agency and the harm principle, can be presented
either narrowly, using the traditional Millian justifications for constraints on liberty, or more broadly, relying upon the findings of behavioral economics in the case of impaired agency or public health’s
population perspective in the case of the harm principle. The third
rationale, based on a population’s positive liberty to self-govern to
improve its own health, rests firmly upon public health’s population
perspective.
Although potentially broad, each of the three justifications implies its own restraints. Most critically, the conditions underlying a
justification need to be met for the justification to be persuasive in
any particular case. Thus, the persuasiveness of the impaired agency
justification requires a reasonably strong basis for believing that the
subject’s agency is in fact impaired, or that material information is
lacking (if the law in question purports to overcome informational
deficiencies).176 Likewise, if a public health law’s legitimacy rests
upon the harm principle, persuasive evidence must exist that the activity regulated creates harm to others. Many public health laws justified under the harm principle, including quarantines and forced

to the Board’s portion cap rule, however, the court failed to adopt a population
perspective and recognize the ways in which the sale of large soda portions affects
population health. See Lindsay F. Wiley, Sugary Drinks, Happy Meals, Social
Norms, and the Law: The Normative Impact of Product Configuration Bans, 46
CONN. L. REV. 1877, 1883–85 (2014); see also Laura Hoffman, Cigarettes vs.
Soda?: The Argument for Similar Public Health Regulation of Smoking and Obesity, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1889, 1893–96 (2014).
176
Cf. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“True consent . . . is the informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to
evaluate knowledgeably the options available and the risks attendant upon
each.”).
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sterilizations, have not met that test.177 In such cases, public health
laws cannot withstand scrutiny under any justification that relies on
public health’s own population perspective. As we shall see, that
raises a problem for those arguing for broad regulation of e-cigarettes.
Likewise, the self-governance justification suggests important
limitations to its own expansive application. As discussed above,
some constraints relate to limits implied broadly by democratic theory and the rule of law. Other limitations pertain to the propensity
of populations to impose costs on others to protect their own health,
or the lack of popular anchoring for many public health laws, especially those enacted by the federal government or promulgated by
administrative agencies pursuant to broad delegations of authority.178 In addition, as with the other rationales, the science matters.
Respect for self-governance counsels that populations should have
a wide berth to determine the value they ascribe to population health
as compared with other goods. Self-governance also suggests populations should be granted broad deference in determining where to
place the burden of scientific uncertainty; in other words, how
strong must be the evidence of harm (or mitigation of harm) before
legal interventions are taken? In effect, populations themselves
should be able to decide whether to adopt a precautionary principle
or demand significant evidence before regulating a product or activity. Self-governance does not, however, justify any and all actions
undertaken in the name of public health.179 Empirical evidence still
matters. Adoption of the precautionary principle, for example, can-

177

The precautionary principle adopted as an exercise of self-governance may
at times provide a different rationale for such measures. Further, respect for selfgovernance suggests that populations should be able to determine within a broad
range the strength of evidence that is required for determining harm. Nevertheless,
as discussed below, the evidence matters. See infra text accompanying notes 179–
81.
178
See supra text accompanying notes 166–75.
179
This is another way of saying that if public health is to matter, it must be
taken seriously. See PARMET, supra note 20, at 268–69. This is not to say that
courts should apply strict scrutiny in all public health cases. Rather, the point here
is simply that if the justification for a law rests on public health, its validity must
necessarily depend upon the strength of the public health evidence.
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not justify banning the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) vaccine, even though many believe it causes autism.180 The science is
too clear: Banning the vaccine would undermine public health. If
public health is the goal, public health science matters to the normative justifications for the law.181
The limitations discussed thus far are internal to the framework
and responsive to the paternalism critique. When one justification is
present, and its limitations are met, a public health law answers the
paternalism critique. But other important constraints are external to
the framework and unrelated to the paternalism critique. For example, the magnitude of the harm to individuals warrants consideration. In its seminal public health law decision, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court recognized the importance of the relationship between a public health law’s impact on individuals and the
magnitude of the harm the law sought to prevent.182 In upholding
Massachusetts’ mandatory smallpox vaccination law, the Court
warned that public health laws “might be exercised in particular circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was
reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or
compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons.”183
The Court’s caution has led Lawrence Gostin to argue that public health laws are constitutional only when there is “public health
necessity, reasonable means, proportionality, harm avoidance, and
fairness.”184 Whether that remains the constitutional standard is debatable;185 nevertheless, the test serves as a useful reminder that the
180

See Sally Greenberg, State of Confusion: One-Third of American Parents
Continue to Link Vaccines and Autism, HUFFPOST HEALTHY LIVING
(Apr. 28, 2014, 11:53 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sally-greenberg/vaccines_b_5169266.html.
181
This is not to say that populations could not choose to ban the vaccine for
other reasons, perhaps for religious reasons. But the ban could not be supported
by a precautionary principle aimed at protecting public health when the evidence
is overwhelming that the ban would harm public health.
182
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27–28 (1905).
183
Id. at 28.
184
GOSTIN, supra note 152, at 126.
185
Gostin’s approach does not perfectly track contemporary constitutional
doctrine. For one thing, despite the growing influence of the paternalism critique,
public health laws that do not implicate constitutionally protected interests routinely survive constitutional attack even in the absence of a showing of necessity.
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degree of coerciveness and the nature of the harm matter, a principle
captured by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ proposal that public
health laws be assessed according to a ladder of intervention.186 As
the council explained,
The least intrusive step is generally ‘to do nothing’,
or at most monitor the situation. The most intrusive
is to legislate in such a way as to restrict the liberties
of individuals, the population as a whole, or specific
industries. In general, the higher the rung on the ladder at which the policy maker intervenes, the
stronger the justification has to be.187
In other words, public health laws that simply provide individuals with information, or pose minor inconveniences, require lesser
showings of harm, and less robust evidence, than more highly coercive laws such as quarantines.
In addition, the nature of the individual interest matters. By
questioning the legitimacy of any limitation of self-regarding actions, the paternalism critique risks treating all restraints on individual action as the same. A law forbidding someone from traveling in
a car without a seatbelt is treated the same as one that violates bodily
integrity or denies freedom of speech. But in our constitutional tradition, some liberties are constitutionally protected fundamental
rights. Others are not, and with good reason. If self-governance is to
have any reign, populations must be able to enact laws to shape their
environment and protect their health. To do so, we need to accept
some infringements on individual liberty. On the other hand, the
Constitution recognizes that certain liberties are of greater value,
and can be limited only when there are compelling reasons.
This is certainly not the place to review which rights are fundamental, or which ought to be. For present purposes it is simply important to note that fundamental rights serve as another external
See, e.g., Gallagher v. City of Clayton, 699 F.3d 1013, 1019–20 (8th Cir. 2012)
(upholding ban on outdoor smoking on public property using rational basis test
because there was no fundamental right to smoke outdoors).
186
NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, PUBLIC HEALTH: ETHICAL ISSUES vi
(2007), http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Public-healthethical-issues.pdf.
187
Id. at xviii.
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limit on public health laws, even when they are otherwise justified
by the self-governance rationale. Indeed, precisely because constitutional rights are designed to be countermajoritarian, they are especially important in such cases. That the Constitution secures such
rights should also serve to remind us that it presumes, in fact secures,
a wide degree of latitude for acts of self-governance, an obvious
point that the paternalism critique too often neglects.
III: THE RISE OF E-CIGARETTES
A. The Market
In large measure, the debates about the appropriateness of regulating cigarettes have been settled. During the past two decades tobacco control laws have proliferated at the federal, state, and local
levels.188 What remains contentious is whether a new approach, one
emphasizing harm reduction189 rather than abstinence, should be
adopted.190
Until recently, the debate over employing harm reduction strategies was largely hypothetical. Although the tobacco industry marketed filtered and “light” cigarettes as if they were safer than more
traditional cigarettes, they were not.191 Nicotine gum and nicotine
patches do offer less dangerous alternatives, but they are generally
recommended for short-term use as individuals try to break the

188

See infra text accompanying notes 266–94.
For a definition of harm reduction, see What Is Harm Reduction?, HARM
REDUCTION INT’L, http://www.ihra.net/what-is-harm-reduction (last visited Nov.
1, 2015) (defining harm reduction as “policies, programmes and practices that aim
to reduce the harms associated with the use of psychoactive drugs in people unable
or unwilling to stop.”).
190
See, e.g., Martin et al., supra note 3, at 123; Stratton et al., supra note 3, at
189, 195.
191
See Lynn T. Kozlowski et al., Smokers’ Misperceptions of Light and Ultralight Cigarettes May Keep Them Smoking, 15 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 9, 9
(1998). This deception has likely added to the suspicions of many tobacco control
advocates toward harm reduction.
189
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habit.192 Moreover, they have only limited efficacy in real-life settings.193
Supporters contend that e-cigarettes can alter the landscape dramatically.194 Available in many shapes and varieties, e-cigarettes
utilize a battery-operated heat source to vaporize liquid containing
nicotine, water, flavorings, and other additives that users inhale.195
Some early models had a light-up tip that glowed to resemble the
light on a conventional cigarette.196 More recent models look less
like cigarettes and often have larger batteries and e-fluid reservoirs.197 Some models also have variable voltage or wattage batteries that allow users to adjust the power to the atomizer.198

192

Scientists have identified various health risks associated with long-term
use of nicotine gum, see Björn Eliasson, Marja-Riitta Taskinen & Ulf Smith,
Long-term Use of Nicotine Gum is Associated with Hyperinsulinemia and Insulin
Resistance, 94 CIRCULATION 878, 878 (1996), and the patch, see Neal L. Benowitz & Steven G. Gourlay, Cardiovascular Toxicity of Nicotine: Implications for
Nicotine Replacement Therapy, 29 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1422, 1422 (1997).
193
See Ricardo Polosa & Neal L. Benowitz, Treatment of Nicotine Addiction:
Present Therapeutic Options and Pipeline Developments, 32 TRENDS
PHARMACOLOGICAL SCI. 281, 281 (2011).
194
See Amy L. Fairchild & Ronald Bayer, Public Health: Smoke and Fire
Over E-Cigarettes, 347 SCI. 375 (2015) (describing the “pitched battle” between
scientists and health experts over e-cigarettes, and arguing that the intensity of the
debate stems from the tensions between the precautionary principle and harm reduction). Another product that has been offered as providing the potential for a
harm-reduction approach to tobacco is Snus, a tobacco pouch that its manufacturer claims has substantially lower risks than cigarettes or other tobacco products.
See Sabrina Tavernise, Swedish Company Asks F.D.A. to Remove Warnings From
Smokeless Tobacco Product, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/09/health/swedish-company-asks-fda-to-remove-warningsfrom-smokeless-tobacco-product.html?_r=0.
195
See AM. INDUS. HYGIENE ASS’N, WHITE PAPER: ELECTRONIC CIGARETTES
IN THE INDOOR ENVIRONMENT 4 (2014), https://www.aiha.org/government-affairs/Documents/Electronc%20Cig%20Document_Final.pdf; see also Daniel F.
Hardin, Blowing Electronic Smoke: Electronic Cigarettes, Regulation, and Protecting the Public Health, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 435, 439 (2011).
196
Lorillard, Inc., Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to Deem Tobacco Products to Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 8 (Apr. 25, 2014),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2014-N-0189-75711
[hereinafter Lorillard Comment Letter].
197
Id. at 9.
198
Id. at 8.
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In contrast to conventional cigarettes, e-cigarettes deliver nicotine without exposing users to the byproducts of tobacco combustion. In addition, because they “replace most of the sensory, behavioural and social components associated with smoking,”199 e-cigarettes may provide users with a safer way to experience the pleasures
of smoking (or simply satisfy the craving for nicotine).200
According to the World Health Organization (“WHO”), “the use
of ENDS [electronic nicotine delivery systems] is apparently booming,” with “use at least doubl[ing] among both adults and adolescents from 2008 to 2012.”201 As of 2013, 47% of smokers in the U.S.
had tried e-cigarettes and 4% were regular users.202
E-cigarettes are especially popular among teens; between 2011
and 2012 recent use of e-cigarettes among middle and high school
students in the U.S. doubled.203 In 2013 alone, 250,000 young people who had never smoked a cigarette used an e-cigarette.204 By
2014, current use of e-cigarettes had eclipsed use of traditional cigarettes among high school and middle schools students in the United

199
Saitta et al., supra note 7, at 50; see also Hardin, supra note 195, at 449
(explaining that “electronic cigarettes not only provide nicotine, but also simulate
the physical act of smoking, which might provide a psychological ‘placebo’ effect
which helps to increase the rate of cigarette abstinence”).
200
See, e.g., Spring Vapor LLC, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to Deem
Tobacco Products to Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 8–
9 (Aug. 8, 2014),
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2014-N-0189-82033;
Joe Nocera, Is Vaping Worse than Smoking?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/opinion/joe-nocera-is-vaping-worse-thansmoking.html?_r=0.
201
WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, ELECTRONIC
NICOTINE DELIVERY SYSTEMS 2 (July 21, 2014), http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/
cop6/FCTC_COP6_10-en.pdf?ua=1.
202
Id. at 2–3.
203
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Notes from the Field: Electronic Cigarette Use Among Middle and High School Students—United States,
2011–2012, 62 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. RPT. 729 (2013),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6235a6.htm.
204
Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, More Than a
Quarter-Million Youth Who had Never Smoked a Cigarette Used E-cigarettes in
2013 (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/p0825-e-cigarettes.html [hereinafter Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention].
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States.205 Importantly, minors who used e-cigarettes were more
likely to express the intention to start smoking cigarettes than nonsmoking youth who had not used e-cigarettes.206
Many public health experts believe the common practice of adding sweet flavors to the liquid nicotine used in e-cigarettes enhances
the products’ popularity with young people.207 Researchers have
also suggested that the popularity of e-cigarettes is “related to the
fact that they can be used in smoke-free areas, to their competitive
price, and to the perceived potential for harm reduction compared
with traditional cigarettes.”208 The wide marketing of e-cigarettes209
has also undoubtedly helped spread their popularity. Nancy Kaufman and Margaret Mahoney explain that the marketing for ENDS
“pervades traditional and social media, using many tactics now
banned for cigarettes such as free samples, billboard ads, event (e.g.,
auto racing, music festivals) or cause sponsorship, and television ads
in prime time.”210 Whether the popularity of e-cigarettes will continue to grow is unclear. In 2014, sales of e-cigarettes fell after three
years of heavy growth.211 Yet overall use of e-cigarettes tripled be-

205

Arrazola et al., supra note 1, at 384.
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, supra note 203; Arrazola et al., supra note 1, at 383–84.
207
E.g., Kim Krisberg, CDC: American Youth Now Use E-cigarettes More
than any Other Tobacco Product, SCI. BLOGS (Apr. 17, 2015), http://scienceblogs.com/thepumphandle/2015/04/17/cdc-american-youth-now-use-e-cigarettes-more-than-any-other-tobacco-product/. A study sponsored by a manufacturer, however, disputes this claim. See Lindsay Fox, New Study: E-Cigarette Flavors Don’t Appeal to Youth Non-Smokers, ECIGARETTE REVIEWED (Jan. 10,
2015), http://ecigarettereviewed.com/E-cigarette-flavors-dont-appeal-to-teens.
208
Saitta, Ferro & Polosa, supra note 7, at 51.
209
Jennifer C. Duke et al., Exposure to Electronic Cigarette Television Advertisements Among Youth and Young Adults, 134 PEDIATRICS 1, 1 (2014).
210
Nancy Kaufman & Margaret Mahoney, E-Cigarettes: Policy Options and
Legal Issues Amidst Uncertainty, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS SUPPLEMENTAL ISSUE
23 (2015).
211
WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, supra note 201,
at 2.
206
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tween 2013 and 2014 among high school and middle school students.212 Much of the growth in sales may be occurring via the Internet213 or in vape shops, which specialize in e-cigarettes. According to the Smoke-Free Alternatives Trade Association (“SFATA”),
the number of vape-shops more than tripled between 2013 and
2014.214
In contrast to the market for cigarettes, which is highly concentrated among brands owned by big tobacco, the e-cigarette market
has been relatively fragmented. According to the WHO, in 2014
there were an estimated 466 brands of e-cigarettes world-wide.215
This diversity brings both strengths and dangers. Some smaller companies, for example, have attempted to position themselves as innovators for harm reduction.216 On the other hand, the large number of
small brands, many of which import their products from China, has
raised alarms about the lack of standardization of ingredients and
the potential for adulteration.217
Recently, large tobacco companies have begun investing heavily
in ENDS and have gained market share. In 2012, for example, Lorillard, Inc. acquired blu eCigs (“blu”) as a wholly owned subsidiary.218 By 2014, blu had over 40% of the retail market in the U.S.219
As of August 2014, Altria Group Inc. and Reynolds American Inc.
212

Arrazola et al., supra note 1, at 383.
Alexandra Sifferlin, It’s Really Easy for Teens to buy E-Cigs Online, TIME
MAG. (Mar. 2, 2015), http://time.com/3725939/teens-buy-ecigarettes-online/.
214
Mike Esterl, Big Tobacco’s E-Cigarette Push Gets a Reality Check, WALL
ST. J., (Aug. 26, 2014, 2:38 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/big-tobaccos-ecig-push-gets-a-reality-check-1409078319.
215
WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, supra note 201,
at 2.
216
iVape/JP Ventures LLC, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule to Deem Tobacco Products to Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Aug.
8, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2014-N-018981964; American E-Liquid Manufacturing Standards Association, Comment Letter on on Proposed Rule to Deem Tobacco Products to Be Subject to the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2014-N-0189-81964.
217
David Barboza, China’s E-Cigarette Boom Lacks Oversight for Safety,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/14/business/international/chinas-e-cigarette-boom-lacks-oversight-for-safety-.html.
218
Lorillard Comment Letter, supra note 196, at 9.
219
Id.
213
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had captured about 25% of convenience store sales.220 Ironically, the
increasing presence of big tobacco in the market may reduce the
dangers of adulteration, as large companies may be better able to
control ingredients.221 Large tobacco companies are also at the vanguard of putting warning labels on their products,222 and they have
supported significant regulation by the FDA.223 Of course, such regulations may disproportionately affect smaller companies lacking
the resources to navigate a complex regulatory process. If so, regulation may benefit the very companies that have the greatest interest
in ensuring that e-cigarette use does not threaten the market for traditional cigarettes.
B. The Health Risks and Benefits of E-Cigarettes
Reviewing the risks and benefits of e-cigarettes involves a calculus far more complex than a mere assessment of whether vaping
a single e-cigarette is more or less dangerous to the user than smoking a single cigarette. Ultimately, a public health analysis must also
weigh the impact of vaping on an individual’s likelihood of smoking
traditional cigarettes. In addition, the analysis must consider
whether the spread of vaping within a population is more or less
likely to increase rates of smoking and exposure to nicotine within
that population. In other words, the critical public health question is
how the growth of e-cigarettes affects the overall incidence of morbidity and mortality within populations.
Given the short time e-cigarettes have been on the market, it is
not surprising that more research is needed before the public health
risks are fully known. Although there are over 1,000 studies published in the literature, the findings are inconsistent.224 Moreover,
many studies suffer from serious methodological flaws or are compromised by conflicts of interest. As the WHO noted in 2014,
220

Esterl, supra note 214.
Barboza, supra note 217.
222
Matt Richtel, Bluntly Dire Warnings from Big Tobacco on Electronic Cigarettes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/29/business/dire-warnings-by-big-tobacco-on-e-smoking-.html.
223
Lorillard Comment Letter, supra, note 196, at 18.
224
Charlotta Pisinger & Martin Døssing, A Systematic Review of Health Effects of Electronic Cigarettes, 69 PREVENTIVE MED. 248, 248 (2014) (reviewing
76 published studies). The science regarding e-cigarettes is rapidly developing.
The discussion here is based on the literature as of October 2015.
221
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“[m]ost ENDS products have not been tested by independent scientists . . . .”225
A few points, however, seem relatively clear.226 The first is that
e-cigarettes are “likely to be much less harmful than tobacco smoking.”227 As a review of the scientific literature by the American Industrial Hygiene Association explained, “[m]any of the toxic and
carcinogenic agents in tobacco cigarette smoke are combustion byproducts, including nitrosamines, VOCs, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (“PAHs”), and carbon monoxide. Because e-cigarettes
do not have a combustion source, the health risks of vaping are believed to be greatly reduced compared with traditional cigarette
smoking.”228 The lack of combustion also means that e-cigarettes
pose a far smaller fire risk than traditional cigarettes.229
Being safer than cigarettes is not the same as posing no risk. Although nicotine, the primary ingredient of most e-cigarette liquids, is
not considered a carcinogen,230 WHO warns that it “can have adverse effects during pregnancy and may contribute to cardiovascular

225

WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, supra note 201,

at 3.
226

For a summary of some what is known about e-cigarettes, see Eric N. Lindblom, Effectively Regulating E-Cigarettes and Their Advertising—and the First
Amendment, 70 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 57, 60–63 (2015).
227
AM. INDUS. HYGIENE ASS’N, supra note 195, at 3; Peter Hajek et al., Electronic Cigarettes: Review of Use, Content, Safety, Effects on Smokers and Potential for Harm and Benefit, 109 ADDICTION 1801, 1806 (2014) (“[L]ong-term use
of EC [electronic cigarettes], compared to smoking, is likely to be much less, if at
all, harmful to users or bystanders.”).
228
AM. INDUS. HYGIENE ASS’N, supra note 195, at 5. See also Saitta, Ferra &
Polosa, supra note 7, at 53.
229
See U.S. FIRE ADMIN., HOME FIRE SAFETY TIPS FOR SMOKERS,
http://www.usfa.fema.gov/downloads/fief/up_in_smoke_smokers_brochure.pdf
(noting that smoking is the top cause of home fire deaths); U.S. FIRE ADMIN.,
ELECTRONIC CIGARETTE FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS (Oct. 2014), http://www.usfa.
fema.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/electronic_cigarettes.pdf [hereinafter U.S.
FIRE ADMIN., ELECTRONIC CIGARETTE FIRES].
230
Konstantinos E. Farsalinos & Riccardo Polosa, Safety Evaluation and Risk
Assessment of Electronic Cigarettes as Tobacco Cigarette Substitutes: A Systematic Review, 5 THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES IN DRUG SAFETY 67, 69 (2014).
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disease.”231 It may also function as a teratogen and can promote cancer growth.232 CDC notes that “[n]icotine exposure during adolescence, a critical window for brain development, might have lasting
adverse consequences for brain development, causes addiction, and
might lead to sustained tobacco use.”233 In addition, nicotine may be
toxic when ingested or exposed to the skin; according to the CDC,
“the number of calls to poison centers involving e-cigarette[s] . . .
rose from one per month in September 2010 to 215 per month in
February 2014 . . . .”234 “More than half . . . of the calls” involved
children under the age of five.235 Although the December 2014 death
of a one-year-old who ingested liquid nicotine received considerable
publicity,236 a review of data from the California Poison Control
System suggests that most of the adverse effects from accidental exposure were short-term and minor.237
Health experts also express concern over the possible health effects of toxic chemicals in e-cigarette vapor.238 For example, a study
reported in a 2015 letter to the editor of the New England Journal of
Medicine found that when high voltages are used, “long-term vaping
is associated with an incremental lifetime cancer risk . . . 5 times as
high . . . or even 15 times as high . . . as the risk associated with

231
WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, supra note 201,
at 3. Hajek et al. dispute the claim that nicotine is harmful, except during pregnancy. Hajek, supra note 227, at 1802.
232
WHO FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON TOBACCO CONTROL, supra note 201,
at 3.
233
Arrazola et al., supra note 1, at 381 (citations omitted).
234
Press Release, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, New CDC
Study Finds Dramatic Increase in E-cigarette-Related Calls to Poison Centers
(Apr. 3, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/p0403-e-cigarette-poison.html.
235
Id.
236
See Gillian Mohney, First Child’s Death From Liquid Nicotine Reported
as ‘Vaping’ Gains Popularity, ABC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2014, 5:40 PM),
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/childs-death-liquid-nicotine-reported-vapinggains-popularity/story?id=27563788.
237
Farsalinos & Polosa, supra note 230, at 80.
238
AM. INDUS. HYGIENE ASS’N., supra note 195, at 5.
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long-term smoking.”239 However, the higher exposure rate to formaldehyde was not found when typical voltage rates were used.240
The vapors formed by e-cigarettes contain other chemicals, including propylene glycol, a chemical contained in theatrical
smoke,241 exposure to which may be associated with asthma, decreased lung function, and airway obstruction.242 E-cigarettes also
contain glycerol, which is generally nontoxic but when heated can
produce the toxin acrolein, which also is produced by smoking cigarettes.243 In addition, some studies have found higher concentrations of some heavy metals in the aerosols of e-cigarettes than in the
smoke of conventional cigarettes.244 Other studies, however, have
reached the opposite conclusion.245 One review of 34 studies found
significant variability in findings as to levels of many toxins,246 perhaps because of the “chaotic” e-liquid manufacturing industry.247 In
contrast, a review of over 100 studies by Farsalinos and Polosa (the
latter of whom has received funding from e-cigarette manufacturers)
concluded that e-cigarettes have fewer toxic chemicals and pose
fewer clinical risks to users and bystanders than conventional cigarettes, although the authors caution that longer-term clinical studies
need to be done.248
There is also a risk of fire caused by the lithium batteries that
heat the liquid nicotine. The U.S. Fire Administration reports at least
25 cases in which e-cigarettes have exploded since 2009.249 After

239
R. Paul Jensen et. al., Hidden Formaldehyde in E-Cigarette Aerosols, 372
NEW ENG. J. MED. 392, 392 (2015).
240
Id. This study has been harshly criticized. See, e.g., Farsalinos, Verified:
Formaldehyde Levels Found in the NEJM Study Were Associated with Dry Puff
Conditions. An Update, ECIGARETTE RESEARCH (Jan. 22, 2015, 1:51 PM),
http://www.ecigarette-research.com/web/index.php/2013-04-07-09-5007/2015/192-form-ver.
241
AM. INDUS. HYGIENE ASS’N., supra note 195, at 8.
242
Id. at 9; see also Hajek, supra note 227, at 1803.
243
Hajek, supra note at 227, at 1803.
244
AM. INDUS. HYGIENE ASS’N., supra note 195, at 12.
245
Id.
246
Pisinger & Døssing, supra note 224, at 250–53.
247
Barboza, supra note 217.
248
Farsalinos & Polosa, supra note 230, at 79.
249
U.S. FIRE ADMIN., ELECTRONIC CIGARETTE FIRES, supra note 229, at 3.
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several incidents in which e-cigarettes started fires in airplane luggage compartments, the Federal Aviation Administration warned
airlines not to store e-cigarettes in checked baggage.250
From public health’s population perspective, the key question
relates to the impact of e-cigarettes on smoking rates. If e-cigarettes
can reduce the overall number of regular smokers, they probably
will function as a form of harm reduction, albeit one with its own
risks. Conversely, if they lead to increases in rates of smoking or
stall reductions in smoking rates, they will likely cause greater mortality and morbidity in the overall population, even if individuals
who vape are exposed to less risk than they would face if they
smoked.
For the moment, the impact of e-cigarettes on smoking rates is
also inconclusive. Several studies have suggested that e-cigarettes
may help some individuals kick the habit.251 Others suggest e-cigarettes are no more effective in supporting smoking cessation than
alternative approaches, such as the nicotine patch.252 After reviewing the literature, Nancy Kaufman and Margaret Mahoney surmise
that although some individuals will use e-cigarettes to stop smoking,
many will use them to reduce their cigarette consumption, engaging
in so-called “dual use.”253 This can provide smokers with the false
assurance that their reduced habit is safe, dissuading them from trying to stop smoking. Likewise, by enabling smokers to get their nicotine fix in smoking-prohibited locations, like the workplace, e-cigarettes may reduce the impetus to stop smoking.
Researchers and public health experts are especially concerned
about the use of e-cigarettes by minors who have never smoked.
Data reported by the CDC show that in 2013 over 250,000 middle
and high school students in the U.S. who had never smoked used e-

250

Alan Levin, FAA Warns E-Cigarettes a Fire Danger in Checked Airline
Bags, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Jan. 23, 2015, 3:05 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-23/faa-sends-notice-to-airlines-about-fire-riskof-e-cigarettes.
251
Pisinger & Døssing, supra note 224, at 256.
252
Id. (discussing studies showing that e-cigarette use is less effective than the
nicotine patch in helping with smoking cessation); Kaufman & Mahoney, supra
note 210, at 23–24; Hajek et al., supra note 227, at 1805 (e-cigarettes can be more
effective than other approaches to smoking cessation).
253
Kaufman & Mahoney, supra note 210, at 24.
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cigarettes.254 Health experts fear that many of these young people
will become addicted to nicotine and end up smoking. A recent
study of high school students in Los Angeles seems to affirm that
fear. It showed that students who used e-cigarettes were more likely
than others to begin smoking within six months or a year.255 Nevertheless, cigarette smoking among youth has declined as e-cigarette
use has increased.256 It thus remains unclear whether e-cigarettes
will lead to more or less smoking among youth.
The science is also not settled as to the long-term impact of ecigarettes on norms and attitudes regarding smoking or on the effectiveness of laws regulating e-cigarettes. As discussed below, one of
the key strategies of tobacco control efforts over the past 50 years
has been to denormalize smoking. This strategy relies on the insight
that individuals do not make decisions about whether or not to
smoke cigarettes in isolation. Rather, individual decisions are influenced by social patterns and norms.257 Thus, in a world in which
smoking is perceived as ubiquitous and glamorous, individuals will
often be inclined to smoke if only to “fit in.” In contrast, if smoking
is less common and associated with less socially “desirable” people,
individuals are less likely to take up the habit.258 As a result, numerous tobacco control strategies seek to “denormalize” tobacco use.259
For example, indoor smoking laws not only reduce exposure to
secondhand smoke, they also stigmatize smokers who are forced to
separate themselves from others to go outside to smoke.260 Likewise, public service campaigns “emphasize the cosmetic effects of
254

Press Release, Center for Disease Control and Prevention, supra note 204.
Adam M. Leventhal et al., Association of Electronic Cigarette Use with
Initiation of Combustible Tobacco Product Smoking in Early Adolescence, 314
JAMA 700, 703 (2015).
256
Arrazola et al., supra note 1, at 381.
257
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Tobacco Free Initiative (TFI): Tobacco
and Youth, http://www.who.int/tobacco/control/populations/youth/en/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2015).
258
Kirsten Bell et al., ‘Every Space is Claimed’: Smokers’ Experiences of Tobacco Denormalisation, 32 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 914, 915 (2010).
259
Lindsay F. Wiley, Shame, Blame, and the Emerging Law of Obesity Control, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 121, 132 (2013).
260
These laws were initially presented as ways of protecting bystanders from
secondhand smoke. See Hardin, supra note 195, at 452. However, they have had
the effect of stigmatizing tobacco use. See Bayer & Stuber, supra note 107, at 47;
Deborah Ritchie et al., “But It Just Has that Sort of Feel About It, A Leper”—
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smoking (yellow teeth, bad breath, smelly clothes and hair, even impotence) or the idea that smoking will lead to rejection by potential
romantic partners.”261
Public health experts worry—with some reason—that e-cigarettes may serve to renormalize smoking. For example, after decades
without cigarette advertising on television, advertisements for e-cigarettes are now appearing with regularity,262 creating the possibility
that the advertising industry will be able to (re)create positive images for the act of inhaling tobacco products. Likewise, in jurisdictions in which indoor smoking laws do not apply to e-cigarettes,263
the appearance of someone inhaling a product that looks a lot like a
cigarette is again occurring with some frequency. As it does, inhaling may become a more common and less stigmatized behavior,
which may lead more people to feel that it is socially acceptable to
smoke conventional cigarettes.
For the moment, however, it is impossible to say whether the
above scenarios will occur. Nor do we know the net impact of the
various changes that vaping may entail. It is possible that attitudes
toward smoking will soften, but that on balance fewer people will
smoke cigarettes than will convert to e-cigarettes. If so, we should
see a net public health benefit. Alternatively, it’s also quite plausible
that more people will become addicted to nicotine than would have
in the absence of e-cigarettes and that with the erosion of social
norms against smoking, rates of cigarette smoking will eventually
climb. And we still don’t know how the technology will evolve. Innovations that increase safety may emerge. Alternatively, new products may provide a more pleasurable and more addictive experience,
leading to more nicotine addiction and eventually more smoking. In
short, regulators don’t know whether regulatory hurdles will protect
or harm public health.
Lack of certainty, however, cannot be the end of the regulatory
story. Clearly, the more we know about the health impacts of e-cigarettes, both upon individuals and populations, the more secure we
can be in our regulatory decisions. But sitting back and waiting for
Stigma, Smoke-Free Legislation and Public Health, 12 NICOTINE & TOBACCO
RES. 622, 622 (2010).
261
Wiley, supra note 259, at 133.
262
Duke et al., supra note 209, at 1.
263
For a discussion, see infra text accompanying note 295.
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more information has its own consequences. As we wait for the evidence, the market will continue to develop and mature, and more
consumers may become addicted to e-cigarettes or accustomed to
seeing vaping in public. Given this possibility, the question of how
and whether to regulate while research continues is challenging for
public health regulators and theorists.
C. The Tobacco Control Legal Environment
The tobacco control laws that have been implemented in the past
50 years illustrate the myriad tools available to regulators regarding
e-cigarettes.264 In 1965, a year after Surgeon General Luther Terry
issued the first surgeon general’s report warning about the health
risks of cigarette smoking, Congress passed the Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act,265 which required warning labels on cigarette
packages, while preempting state regulation of cigarette marketing.266 In 1971, the warning labels were strengthened, and Congress
banned cigarette advertising on television.267 In 1986, the federal
regulatory regime, along with preemption, was extended to smokeless tobacco.268
By the 1990s, evidence of the deleterious effects of secondhand
smoke, as well as deliberate efforts by tobacco companies to mislead
the public about the dangers of smoking, prompted new regulatory
efforts.269 In 1996 the FDA issued broad regulations relating to
youth access, marketing, and labeling.270 These regulations were
264
For an overview of cigarette regulation in the U.S., see generally Herington, supra note 113.
265
Nat’l Comm’n Marihuana & Drug Abuse, History of Tobacco Regulation,
SCHAFFER LIBR.DRUG POL’Y, http://druglibrary.org/schaffer/library/studies/nc/
nc2b.htm (last visited July 22, 2015); Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331–39 (1965 & Supp. I 1966).
266
Id. at §§ 1333–34; Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 514
(1992).
267
Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1333, 1335
(1970).
268
Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, 15
U.S.C. §§ 4401–4408 (1986).
269
These efforts were also spurred in part by a new wave of tort litigation,
which uncovered damaging tobacco company documents and moved tobacco
companies to be less resistant to regulation. For a discussion, see BRANDT, supra
note 82, at 401–45.
270
21 C.F.R. § 1140 (2010).

2016]

PATERNALISM, SELF-GOVERNANCE, AND PUBLIC HEALTH

935

struck down in Brown & Williamson, when the Supreme Court concluded that the FDA lacked authority to regulate tobacco under the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).271
In the absence of broad federal regulations, state and local governments adopted a wide range of regulatory interventions.272 In
1990, for example, San Luis Obispo, California, became the first
city to enact a comprehensive ban on indoor smoking.273 As of 2014,
27 states and the District of Columbia had some form of statewide
indoor smoking ban,274 and by January 2016, 26 states and territories
and 802 localities banned indoor smoking in all non-hospitality
workplaces, restaurants, and bars.275 States and cities also led the
way with banning cigarette sales to minors,276 prohibiting advertisements on billboards,277and banning the addition of flavors in cigarettes and cigars.278 State and local governments have taxed cigarettes to increase the cost of smoking (and raise revenue), a strategy
especially relevant to youth smoking rates, as young smokers tend

271

529 U.S. 120, 161 (1999).
For a discussion of the development and diffusion of local tobacco regulations, see Diller, supra note 161, at 1224–31.
273
Id. at 1229.
274
Claire Zillman, Wait, You Can Still Smoke in an American Office?
FORTUNE (Oct. 23, 2014, 2:05 PM), http://fortune.com/2014/10/23/smoking-office/.
275
AMERICAN NONSMOKERS’ RIGHTS FOUNDATION, U.S. 100% SMOKEFREE
LAWS IN NON-HOSPITALITY WORKPLACES AND RESTAURANTS AND BARS (Oct. 2,
2015), http://no-smoke.org/pdf/WRBLawsMap.pdf.
276
See e.g., Diller, supra note 161, at 1231 (“In addition to outdoor advertising
restrictions and second-hand smoke regulations, cities have led in adopting a number of . . . tobacco control mechanisms, often focusing on preventing youth access
to tobacco, whether directly or indirectly”); Nat’l Comm’n Marihuana & Drug
Abuse, supra note 265 (“All 50 states [h]ad laws banning sales to minors by
1950.”). Federal law now prohibits the sale of cigarettes to minors. 21 C.F.R.
§ 1140.14 (2015).
277
Diller, supra, note 161, at 1226. In Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533
U.S. 525, 551 (2001), the Supreme Court held that such laws were preempted by
the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.
278
Diller, supra note 161, at 1234.
272
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to be more price-sensitive than adults.279 Together these various regulatory tools are widely credited with helping lower rates of cigarette smoking.280
Litigation has also helped change the environment in which cigarettes are sold and consumed. In the 1990s, several states sued large
tobacco companies seeking to recover the health care costs they
faced as a result of smoking-related illness.281 This litigation was
settled by the 1998 Multi-State Master Settlement Agreement,
which imposed significant changes in the marketing and advertising
of cigarettes and required tobacco companies to pay billions of dollars to the states, the cost of which helped raise the price of cigarettes.282 Shortly thereafter, the federal government sued the tobacco
companies under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).283 A 2014 consent decree in that case required
tobacco companies to admit in advertising that they had lied about
the effects of smoking.284
In 2009, Congress gave the FDA broad authority over tobacco
products with the TCA, which created a new center for tobacco
products within the FDA, prohibited the sale of cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco to minors, and granted the FDA authority over
product marketing and advertising, warning labels, and product ingredients.285 The Act also requires the registration of all entities that
own or operate any establishment engaged in the manufacture or
processing of tobacco products.286 In addition, the TCA requires
279
Robert L. Rabin, Reexamining the Pathways to Reduction in Tobacco-Related Disease, 15 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 507, 513–14 (2014).
280
Id.
281
For a fuller discussion, see BRANDT, supra note 82, at 319–55.
282
See Herington, supra note 113, at 14.
283
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c)–(d)(2012); Robert J. Baehr, A New Wave of Paternalistic Tobacco Regulation, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1663, 1673 n.54 (2010).
284
Consent Order Implementing the Corrective Statements Remedy Under
Order #1015 and Order #34-Remand at 2, Tobacco-Free Kids Action Fund v.
Philip Morris USA Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006), http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/content/what_we_do/industry_watch/doj/corrective_statements/2014_06_03_consent_order.pdf.
285
See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control and Federal Retirement Reform, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009); see also 21 U.S.C. § 387
(2012); Herington, supra note 113, at 14–15.
286
Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control and Federal Retirement
Reform, Pub. L. No. 11-31, 123 Stat. 1776, § 905 (2009).
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premarket review of any new tobacco product, unless the Secretary
determines that the product is substantially equivalent to one on the
market as of February 2007, the “predicate date.”287 An application
for premarket review must contain all information that is published,
known, or should be known concerning the health risks associated
with the product, the listing of all ingredients, and samples of the
product and its proposed labeling.288 The Secretary may deny an application upon finding that the applicant has not shown that the marketing of the product is appropriate for the protection of public
health, the making and handling of the product do not conform to
good manufacturing practices, or the labeling is false or misleading.289
The Act also regulates the sale and marketing of a modified risk
product, which is defined as “any tobacco product that is sold or
distributed for use to reduce harm or the risk of tobacco-related disease associated with commercially marketed tobacco products.”290
In addition, the Act prohibits manufacturers from making health
claims not independently verified.291
The TCA also made important modifications to the division of
authority between the federal government and the states with respect
to cigarette regulations.292 Under the TCA, states may not impose
any regulations relating to premarket review, misbranding and labeling, good manufacturing standards, modified risk products, and
adulteration.293 States, however, can enact laws “relating to the sale,
distribution, possession, information reporting to the State, exposure
to, access to, the advertising and promotion of, or use of, tobacco
products by individuals of any age, or relating to fire safety standards . . . .”294

287

21 U.S.C. § 387j(e) (2012).
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289
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(2008), Lorillard v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), and Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
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D. Regulatory Options
Once e-cigarettes entered the market, policymakers were forced
to consider how they fit into the existing regulatory framework. For
states and local governments, a key question is whether existing indoor air laws apply to e-cigarettes. Given the language of such laws,
the answer is often “no.” For example, the Attorney General of Kansas concluded that his state’s indoor smoking law did not apply to
e-cigarettes because it defined smoking as the “possession of a
lighted cigarette, cigar, pipe or burning tobacco in any other form or
device designed for the use of tobacco.”295
In recent years, however, several states and many localities have
enacted measures to apply their indoor smoking bans to e-cigarettes.
As of January 2016, eight states banned vaping in smoke-free venues and sixteen restricted it in some venues.296 Moreover, 475 cities
and counties have banned vaping in smoke-free venues, and 310 restricted vaping in other venues.297 As of March 2015, forty-one
states banned the sale of e-cigarettes to minors.298 However, five
states preempted local regulations.299
States have also had to consider whether to tax e-cigarettes. Because e-cigarettes do not generally fall within the definition of state
tobacco taxes, states risk losing tax revenue as e-cigarettes displace
295

Hardin, supra note 195, at 453 (quoting Kansas Indoor Clean Air Act,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4009(o) (West 2010)).
296
AM. NONSMOKERS’ RIGHTS FOUND., STATES AND MUNICIPALITIES WITH
LAWS REGULATING USE OF ELECTRONIC CIGARETTES (Jan. 1, 2016),
http://www.no-smoke.org/pdf/ecigslaws.pdf.
297
Id. As of January 2015, only one reported case had challenged such laws.
In In re Kuhn v. County of Suffolk, No. 48869, 2010 Misc. LEXIS 5224 at *1–2
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 15, 2010), the court rejected a challenge to a county ordinance
banning the use of e-cigarettes in public places.
298
Silvia Fernandez, Study Reveals E-Cigarette Industry Still Needs Deeper
Regulation, PIONEER NEWS (Mar. 1, 2015), http://www.piercepioneer.com/studyreveals-e-cigarette-industry-still-needs-deeper-regulation/38456. New York City
has gone further and has banned the sale of e-cigarettes to anyone under the age
of 21. Bloomberg Signs NYC Ban of Tobacco Sales to Anyone Under 21, CBS
NEW YORK (Nov. 19, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2013/11/19/
bloomberg-to-sign-nyc-ban-of-tobacco-sales-to-anyone-under-21/.
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E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.8 (2014); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 202.249(4)-(5) (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-504 (2013); IOWA CODE
§ 453A.56 (2014); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-1527 (2014); see also OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 37 § 600.10 (2014) (youth access).
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cigarette sales.300 To address this, in 2012 Minnesota became the
first state to enact a specific tax, at a rate of 95%, for e-cigarettes.301
Since then, other governors have called for taxing e-cigarettes, but
as of January 2015, no other states have done so.302
At the federal level, the key question has been whether or not the
FDA can or should exert regulatory authority over e-cigarettes. In
April 2009, the FDA ordered that a shipment of e-cigarettes imported by NJOY be denied entry into the U.S. on the grounds that
they were “adulterated, misbranded or unapproved drug-device
combinations under the FDCA.”303 That same month, another importer, Smoking Everywhere, Inc., asked a federal court to enjoin
the FDA from regulating e-cigarettes.304 NJOY joined as an intervenor and filed its own request for a preliminary injunction, which the
district court granted, and which the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia affirmed largely on the authority of
Brown & Williamson.305 According to the court, Brown & Williamson made clear that the FDCA provided the FDA with no regulatory
authority over tobacco products except when they are marketed for
therapeutic purposes.306 That conclusion, the court asserted, was
bolstered by the subsequent passage of the TCA, which sought to
fill the regulatory gap.307

300

Elaine S. Povich, States Trying to Tax E-Cigarettes, GOVERNING (Jan. 23,
2015), http://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/states-trying-totax-e-cigarettes.html. Of course the states also lose revenue when cigarette sales
decline through successful public health campaigns. As many have noted, tobacco
taxes create a perverse incentive by which states become dependent on continued
smoking. Andrew J. Haile, Sin Taxes: When the State Becomes the Sinner, 82
TEMP. L. REV. 1041, 1044 (2009).
301
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USA TODAY (Dec. 9, 2013, 11:45 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/12/09/stateline-e-cigarette-revenue/3918913/.
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Under the TCA, a “tobacco product” includes “any product
made or derived from tobacco that is intended for human consumption, including any component, part, or accessory of a tobacco product (except for raw materials other than tobacco used in manufacturing a component, part, or accessory of a tobacco product).”308 Because the nicotine used in e-cigarette cartridges derives from tobacco, e-cigarettes clearly fall within that definition. However, the
Act gives FDA regulatory authority over only “cigarettes, cigarette
tobacco, roll-your-own tobacco, [] smokeless tobacco and . . . any
other tobacco products that the Secretary by regulation deems to be
subject to this subchapter.”309 Hence the FDA’s jurisdiction over
“any other tobacco products,” including e-cigarettes, depends upon
the agency deeming the products to be subject to the Act.
Despite calls by the tobacco control community to act quickly,
the FDA took no action until April 2014 when it issued the NPRM
proposing to deem all tobacco products, with the possible exception
of premium cigars and accessories, to be subject to the TCA.310 In
the NPRM, the FDA explained that the regulations would allow it
to take enforcement actions against e-cigarettes that were misbranded or adulterated.311 In addition, the provisions of the TCA applicable to all tobacco products would apply to e-cigarettes, meaning
that e-cigarette manufacturers would have to submit a list of their
ingredients to the FDA, would be subject to the TCA’s regulations
regarding modified risk descriptors, would be barred from distributing free samples, and would have to submit their products for premarket review.312 In other words, the regulatory regime applicable
to cigarettes would largely apply to e-cigarettes.
In the NPRM, the FDA also proposed several additional regulations, including setting 18 as the minimum age for purchase, requir-
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21 U.S.C. § 321(rr)(1) (2012).
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 387a (2012).
310
Deeming Tobacco Products to be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act; Regulations on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required Warning Statements for Tobacco Products, 79 Fed. Reg. 23142 (proposed
Apr. 25, 2014) (to be codified at 21 CFR pts. 1100, 1140, 1143).
311
Id. at 23143.
312
Id. at 23148.
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ing health warnings as to addictiveness, and barring vending machine sales except in adults-only facilities.313 It also sought public
comments as to whether it should ban the addition of flavorings to
the nicotine liquids used in e-cigarettes.314 The agency added that it
lacked “sufficient data . . . to determine what effects e-cigarettes
have on the public health,” and that it sought comments on how such
products should be regulated.315
Many tobacco control and public health advocates have either
supported the proposed regulations or sought even stronger actions.316 Some e-cigarette trade associations and manufacturers also
supported many of the regulatory steps proposed by the FDA, including barring sales to youth, authorizing the FDA to act against
misbranded or adulterated products, and requiring companies to list
product ingredients.317 Other industry commentators, however,
raised concerns about some other aspects of the proposed regulations, especially the imposition of premarket review, which the FDA
specifically noted would come into effect if e-cigarettes were
deemed to be tobacco products.318 Recall that under the TCA, new
tobacco products that cannot establish “substantial equivalence” to
a product on the market in 2007 (the predicate date) need to go
through a full premarket review.319 Because e-cigarettes are so new,
both the FDA and industry groups concede that it might be impossible to demonstrate substantial equivalence to a product on the market on the predicate date of 2007 for most, if not all, products now
sold.320
313

Id. at 23143–44.
Id. at 23144.
315
Id.
316
See Jonathan H. Adler et al., Bootleggers, Baptists, and E-Cigs,
REGULATION, Spring 2015, at 30–33 (describing the public health community’s
“scorn” for e-cigarettes and their advocacy for greater regulation).
317
E.g., id. at 33 (surveying support for regulation by large tobacco companies, which Adler and colleagues ascribe to a desire to maintain their cartel).
318
See id. at 35.
319
21 U.S.C. § 387j(e) (2012).
320
Lorillard Comment Letter, supra note 196, at 29; The FDA & Deeming
Regulations of E-cigarettes, CASAA (Mar. 3, 2013), http://casaa.org/deeming_
regulations.html.
In the final regulations, the FDA stated that it had identified some e-cigarettes
on the market as of the predicate date. See Deeming Tobacco Products to Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the Family
314
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In response to the NPRM, many industry groups argued that the
premarket review process would stifle innovation and potentially
kill the industry because manufacturers simply cannot present the
type of evidence required for premarket review, nor does the FDA
have evidence necessary to do the assessments required by the statute.321 Recognizing the problem, the FDA proposed using its discretion to give manufacturers a two-year grace period in which to seek
premarket review.322 This would enable manufacturers to continue
marketing their products without premarket review for two years after the effective date of the deeming regulations. The FDA claimed,
however, that it lacked the discretion to go further and spare e-cigarettes from premarket review using the 2007 date.323
In June 2015, a report by the House Appropriations Committee
expressed support for most of the deeming regulations, urging the
FDA to issue them swiftly.324 The report further urged the FDA to
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act: Restrictions on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required Warning Statements for Tobacco
Products, supra note 10, at 81 Fed. Reg. at 28978.
321
Guy Bentley, FDA Regulations Could Wipe Out 99 Percent of E-Cigarette
Industry, DAILY CALLER, (Aug. 14, 2015, 2:22 PM), dailyaller.com/2015/08/14/
fda-regulations-could-wipe-out-99-percent-of-e-cigarette-industry. Jonathan Adler and colleagues argue that large tobacco companies are working to stop disruption innovation by supporting cartelizing the e-cig industry by way of regulation.
Adler et al., supra note 316, at 30.
322
Deeming Tobacco Products to be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act; Regulations on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required Warning Statements for Tobacco Products, 79 Fed. Reg. 23142, 23144
(proposed Apr. 25, 2014) (to be codified at 21 CFR pts. 1100, 1140, 1143). Products that can establish the existence of a substantially equivalent product on the
market on or before 2007 face a substantially less complex and more expedited
review process. Id.
In the final regulations promulgated while this article was in press, the FDA
provided for three different periods of up to 14, 30, or 36 months, depending upon
the patheway chosen, for a manufacturer to obtain premarket review and authorization from the FDA. See Deeming Tobacco Products to Be Subject to the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention
and Tobacco Control Act: Restrictions on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco
Products and Required Warning Statements for Tobacco Products, supra note 10,
at 81 Fed. Reg. at 28977–78.
323
79 Fed. Reg. at 23174 (“[W]e do not believe that we have the authority to
amend [this grandfathering date],” which is set by statute.).
324
H.R. REP. NO. 114-205, at 75 (2015).
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ban the sale of all tobacco products to minors, and “to make childresistant packaging and warning labels mandatory for liquids used
with electronic-cigarette vaporizers.”325 The Committee, however,
also voiced concerns about the use of 2007 as the predicate date for
premarket review for newly deemed tobacco products, stating that it
would add to the logjam of applications for review and divert the
agency from “its core mission to promote public health, ensure the
safe use of these products and prevent underage use and abuse.”326
While asserting its belief that the FDA had the discretion to change
the predicate date, the Committee added language to the appropriations bill to require the FDA to treat the effective date of the deeming regulations as the predicate date for newly deemed tobacco products.327 This would mean that e-cigarettes that are currently sold
could remain in the market without premarket review. New products
introduced after the regulations’ effective date could bypass full review by establishing substantial equivalence to products sold before
the effective date of the regulations. The bill would also allow products to enter and remain on the market for 21 months after the effective date of the regulations while they undergo review for substantial
equivalence.328
Shortly after the Committee issued its report, the FDA published
an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“ANPRM”) seeking
comments, data, and information regarding whether it should require nicotine warnings and/or child-resistant packaging for liquid
nicotine.329 It remains unclear when the FDA will issue the deeming
regulations and what form they will take.

325

Id.
Id.
327
Id.
328
Id.
329
Nicotine Exposure Warnings and Child-Resistant Packaging for Liquid
Nicotine, Nicotine-Containing E-Liquid(s), and Other Tobacco Products, Request
for Comments, 80 Fed. Reg. 37555 (July 1, 2015) (to be codified at 21 CFR pts.
1100, 1140, 1143).
326
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IV: REGULATING E-CIGARETTES
The three justifications discussed in Part II—impaired agency,
harm to others, and self-governance—provide a powerful framework for assessing the normative justifiability of public health laws.
The framework differs from other approaches to regulatory decision-making, such as those relying upon cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness analysis, by responding directly to the paternalism critique,
basing its support for public health law on either well-established
justifications for paternalism (in the case of impaired agency or the
harm principle) or the enhancement of liberty itself, in the case of
the self-governance rationale.330 In addition, as explained above, by
demanding that each public health law satisfy the conditions of at
least one of the three justifications, the framework provides important constraints on limitations on liberty imposed in the name of
public health. Thus, the framework provides both robust support and
significant restraints on the scope of public health laws. It also offers
guidance as to when regulators should proceed in the face of significant scientific uncertainty.
The discussion below applies the framework to some of the oftdiscussed regulations of e-cigarettes.331 As the analysis suggests, the
three justifications can be read broadly to offer a far wider berth for
the regulation of e-cigarettes than many critics of laws regulating
NCDs accept. Yet by demanding that each regulation satisfy the
conditions of at least one justification, the framework also exposes
serious doubts about some regulations that would come into effect
under the FDA’s proposed deeming regulations in the absence of
further congressional action.
330

Cf. FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING 8–9 (2004) (arguing that
cost-benefit analysis devalues life and nature by treating them as commodities);
Robert R.M. Verchick, The Case Against Cost Benefit Analysis, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q.
349, 360 (2005) (reviewing FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS:
ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004))
(“Governance based on welfare maximization stands in tension with the traditional liberal view, which holds that an individual should not be used only as a
means to another’s end.”).
331
Because the question of whether e-cigarettes should be taxed in a manner
similar to cigarettes raises additional issues, including the raising of revenue and
the distribution of tax burdens, the discussion below does not address this possible
form of regulation.
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A. Impaired Agency
Consider first the least contentious type of regulation relating to
e-cigarettes: Barring sales to youth. As noted above, use of e-cigarettes by minors is rising, even as teen smoking rates are falling.332
Whether the two phenomena are causally related is unknown. Nor
do we know the long-term population impact of youth vaping. Ecigarettes may possibly displace traditional cigarettes and lead to a
reduction in population harm. Or, the increasing popularity of e-cigarettes among youth may increase nicotine addiction, renormalize
cigarette use, and eventually support an increase in smoking rates.
The significant scientific uncertainty poses a problem for attempts to justify the regulation of youth access based on the harm
principle. We just don’t know whether youth vaping harms others.
But in the case of youth, the harm principle is not a necessary justification. The impaired decision-making rationale suffices. Because
teenage brains are insufficiently developed, and minors are impressionable, we accept that they are not consistently able to exercise the
type of informed agency the paternalism critique seeks to protect.
For this reason, there is broad agreement that paternalistic laws are
appropriate to protect minors.333 In the case of e-cigarettes, this
agreement supports laws limiting youth access, including regulations requiring childproof packaging (which would protect very
young children from poisoning hazards) and laws barring youth
sales, including by banning vending machine sales in establishments
not limited to adults.334 This is so even though barring youth access
may harm public health by decreasing the availability and use of ecigarette as compared with traditional cigarettes.

332

See supra text accompanying notes 203–207.
This is not to say that youth bans are paternalistic. Because such laws operate more directly on the seller of e-cigarettes than the youth the laws seek to
protect, it is plausible to argue that, strictly speaking, these laws are not paternalistic. See supra text accompanying notes 60–63.
334
This is what the FDA has proposed in its so-called deeming regulations.
See Deeming Tobacco Products to be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control
Act; Regulations on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required
Warning Statements for Tobacco Products, 79 Fed. Reg. 23142, 23144 (proposed
Apr. 25, 2014) (to be codified at 21 CFR pts. 1100, 1140, 1143).
333
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Interestingly, the existence of scientific uncertainty strengthens
the justification for regulations aimed at preventing youth from using e-cigarettes. Respect for individual autonomy may oblige us to
allow (informed) adults to make their own decisions in the face of
scientific uncertainty. But the uncertainty adds enormous complexity to the decision to vape, requiring the individual to weigh shortterm pleasures against unknown long-term risks.335 Because teens
may be especially challenged in assessing long-term risks,336 the
idea that they can make fully informed and carefully reasoned decisions regarding unknown dangers is unsustainable. For this reason
we do not ordinarily permit minors (without a showing of maturity)
to make decisions about their medical care, and we treat them as
especially vulnerable subjects in human research trials.337 The addictiveness of e-cigarettes only compounds the impairment of
agency. We know young people significantly overestimate their
ability to stop smoking.338 This suggests that they are unlikely to be
335

Although it is safer for any individual to vape than to smoke, the scientific
uncertainty that exists remains critical to a rational agent’s decision to use e-cigarettes, and thus adds to the reasons we are justified in acting paternalistically on
behalf of minors. First, we don’t yet know the long-term effects of e-cigarettes on
individuals, both as to their direct health impacts and as to the potential to increase
the risk of smoking. Second, a rational agent may want to know the population
impacts of e-cigarettes. Will use of e-cigarettes increase rates of smoking among
others in their community? But as noted above, the answers to these questions
remain unknown.
336
Alexander Persoskie, How Well Can Adolescents Really Judge Risk? Simple, Self Reported Risk Factors Out-Predict Teens’ Self Estimates of Personal
Risk, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 1, 4 (2013) (finding that a small subset
of risk factors significantly outpredict teens’ self-estimates of risk).
337
See Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose Body Is It Anyway? An Updated
Model of Healthcare Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 251, 253 (2005) (“In the health care context, the law has traditionally erred on the side of protecting young people from themselves . . . and vesting
most decision-making authority in parents or other guardians. For the most part,
with important exceptions, people under the age of eighteen may not make binding decisions about their own medical care.”).
338
Tara Mantler, A Systematic Review of Smoking Youths’ Perceptions of Addiction and Health Risks Associated with Smoking: Utilizing the Framework of
the Health Belief Model, 21 ADDICTION RES. & THEORY 306, 313 (2013) (“[T]he
results of this systematic appraisal suggested youth were optimistic about their
cigarette addiction, health risks, and consequences of smoking, and rationalized
smoking by thinking perceived barriers to quitting outweigh perceived benefits.”).
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able to fully assess their ability to stop vaping if and when they want
to.
Critically, the impaired agency rationale for banning the sale of
e-cigarettes to minors is based on the fact that youth lack full decision-making capacity, rather than the dangerousness of e-cigarettes.
In other words, we can justify banning sales of e-cigarettes and eliquid to minors, as suggested by the ANPRM, not because we know
bans will protect their health, but because youth may not be able to
assess what they would like to do if they were fully informed and
mature in the face of scientific uncertainty. But banning youth sales
might end up harming their health (if they smoke instead). On the
other hand, as long as we envision a ban on the sale of e-cigarettes
or e-cigarette liquids to minors as a public health law, we need at
least a plausible reason for believing it will protect health. To put it
another way, if the weight of the evidence showed that banning
youth sales would harm minors’ health, a ban could not be justified
as a public health law that compensated for the impaired decisionmaking of youth. But given the scientific uncertainty, restrictions on
youth sales may be warranted to compensate for the teens’ impaired
decision-making.
The impairment of agency rationale also provides support for
some regulations not specifically aimed at youth. As noted above,
the decision-making of otherwise competent adults can be impaired
by informational deficits.339 In such cases, the impaired agency rationale supports laws that provide individuals with information material to their decision-making, or prevent them from making
choices they would not make were they fully and accurately informed.
In the case of e-cigarettes, this rationale supports the FDA asserting authority to undertake enforcement actions against manufacturers that make unsupported and therefore misleading therapeutic
claims for e-cigarettes.340 The rationale also suggests regulators
339

See supra text accompanying notes 82–96.
See Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891 (D.C. Cir. 2010). After several years
of inaction, in the spring of 2015 the FDA issued its first warning letters relating
to e-cigarettes. Anthony “Tony” Pavel & Jonathan A. Havens, FDA Issues First
E-Cigarette Warning Letters, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/fda-issues-first-e-cigarette-warning-letters (“The [FDA] is not
waiting to finalize the ‘deeming rule’ before taking enforcement action against [ecigarette] and e-liquid companies.”).
340

948

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:879

should have the authority, which the FDA would attain under the
deeming regulations, to act against misbranded or adulterated e-cigarettes.341 Clearly laws that protect people from false information do
not undermine the liberty of those protected (though such laws do
limit the liberty of those who sell misbranded products).342
The same reasoning would apply to a law requiring e-cigarette
manufacturers to disclose their ingredients. Enormous heterogeneity
now exists in the ingredients found in e-cigarette liquids.343 Because
it is impractical for consumers to uncover product information on
their own, a law requiring the disclosure of product ingredients
would support consumers’ decision-making.344 The deeming regulations would do precisely that, requiring manufacturers to report
their ingredients to the FDA,345 which would then be required to
make the ingredients public.346
The impaired decision-making justification also supports the requirement for warning labels regarding the addictiveness of e-cigarettes, as proposed in the NPRM.347 Although the addictive nature
341

See Deeming Tobacco Products to be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
Control Act; Regulations on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and
Required Warning Statements for Tobacco Products, 79 Fed. Reg. 23142, 23148
(proposed Apr. 25, 2014) (to be codified at 21 CFR pts. 1100, 1140, 1143). This
argument could potentially be made to justify premarket review, as that requirement could be viewed as a regulatory compensation for the consumers’ inability
to know if the product is safe. For a discussion as to why the harm principle does
not justify premarket review, see infra text accompanying notes 360–61.
342
See Mariner, supra note 62, at 1826.
343
Christoph Hutzler et al., Chemical Hazards Present in Liquids and Vapors
of Electronic Cigarettes, 88 ARCHIVES TOXICOLOGY 1295, 1304 (2014) (“Our
data . . . confirm the presence of a wide range of flavors and additives in e-cigarette liquids [including] some potentially allergenic compounds . . . .”).
344
Laws requiring the disclosure of truthful, non-misleading information in a
commercial context do not generally violate the First Amendment. See Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985);
Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18, 21 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
345
21 U.S.C. § 387a(a)(1) (2012); Guidance for Industry: Listing of Ingredients in Tobacco Products, FDA (Nov. 2009), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/TobaccoProducts/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/ucm192053.pdf.
346
21 U.S.C. § 387d(a), (e); Harmful and Potentially Harmful Constituents in
Tobacco Products and Tobacco Smoke: Established List, 77 Fed. Reg. 20,034
(Mar. 31, 2015).
347
See Deeming Tobacco Products to be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, as Amended by the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco
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of traditional cigarettes is well-known,348 e-cigarettes are relatively
new products. Users should know they are addictive in order to
make an informed choice.349 For much the same reason, the impaired agency rationale would appear to support regulations requiring warnings about the known potential dangers of e-cigarettes or eliquids, as suggested by the ANPRM. The rationale would also support a regulation requiring manufacturers and sellers to inform consumers that the long-term and population-wide health risks and benefits of these products are not yet known. In a sense, the scientific
uncertainty is itself information that people should know about, lest
they mistakenly conclude that the absence of health warnings means
e-cigarettes have been proven safe.350 To date, the FDA has not proposed such a warning.
It is far less certain whether the impaired agency justification
supports laws subjecting e-cigarettes to the full panoply of TCA regulations pertaining to the marketing of traditional cigarettes, including premarket review with a 2007 predicate date (which might effectively act as a ban on brands sold by smaller manufacturers), or
regulations of advertisements on televisions or billboards.351 Cer-

Control Act; Regulations on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and
Required Warning Statements for Tobacco Products, 79 Fed. Reg. 23142, 23163
(proposed Apr. 25, 2014) (to be codified at 21 CFR pts. 1100, 1140, 1143).
348
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., HOW TOBACCO SMOKE
CAUSES DISEASE: THE BIOLOGY AND BEHAVIORAL BASIS FOR SMOKINGATTRIBUTABLE DISEASE 105 (2010); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION: A REPORT OF
THE SURGEON GENERAL (1988).
349
See, e.g., Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 87, at 216.
350
As suggested above, the existence of scientific uncertainty may play out
somewhat differently with minors, whose decision-making capacity is presumed
to be impaired. For competent adults, the impaired agency justification simply
supports laws that compensate for the decisional deficiency, such as the lack of
knowledge of scientific uncertainty. For minors the deficiency runs deeper; we
can question their ability to make judgments that respect their own choices even
when information is complete. Scientific uncertainty adds a measure of complexity that provides further support for limiting minors’ agency (by banning their
purchase of the product).
351
Health authorities often attempt to debias by engaging in counteradvertising. This form of debiasing can raise ethical issues regarding the government’s

950

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:879

tainly, concern about the impaired decision-making of youth provides some justification for regulating the marketing of e-cigarettes,
especially when the advertising is directed at minors. Moreover,
even when directed at adults, marketing regulations can serve as a
form of debiasing that seeks to overcome advertisers’ ability to manipulate consumers’ cognitive errors, such as the optimism bias,
which may lead them to underestimate the risk of addiction.352 Likewise, premarket review can be viewed as a regulatory compensation
for consumers’ inability to know whether the e-cigarettes they use
are safe, as is the case with pharmaceuticals.
Nevertheless, there are several reasons why the impaired agency
justification does not currently support restrictions on the marketing
of e-cigarettes that go beyond prohibiting deceptive advertising,
banning advertisements aimed at youth, and mandating ingredient
listings and product warnings. Most critically, because of the scientific uncertainty about the long-term and net effects of e-cigarettes,
regulators are not in a position to know that either premarket review
or advertising regulations would help individuals exercise the
choices they would make if they were fully informed and fully rational. This is for two reasons. First, rational people can and do make
different decisions about how to proceed in the face of uncertainty.
Thus regulators cannot be confident that product or advertising bans
would help consumers achieve the outcomes they would want if they
were fully informed about the scientific uncertainty. Second, even if
we accept that individuals value their health, and would factor negative health effects of e-cigarettes into their decision-making, the
scientific uncertainty bars assurance that advertising restrictions or
premarket review would further individual health goals. To the contrary, it is possible that such regulations would undermine health by
reducing individuals’ use of e-cigarettes in lieu of traditional cigarettes.353 If so, premarket review and advertising restrictions would
attempt to manipulate people. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 87, at 232. Informational campaigns, however, are not forms of regulation, and are thus outside the
scope of this analysis.
352
For a discussion on how advertising exploits cognitive biases, see Paul
Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in the
First Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 53–55 (2003).
353
This is so even in the case of nonsmokers. Especially in the case of young
adults, we cannot know if they would be more likely to begin smoking if they did
not feel that e-cigarettes provided a safer alternative.
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not put into place the outcome individuals would seek in the absence
of the informational deficiencies.
Finally, the limits external to the impaired agency justification
offer an additional argument against restricting the advertising of ecigarettes. Recall that in addition to the justifications for public
health laws, we need to consider the nature of the individual interests
restrained. This normative principle is reflected in constitutional
law, which demands a higher degree of justification for laws that
infringe upon protected rights, including freedom of speech. Under
current doctrine, laws regulating truthful and non-misleading commercial speech are permissible only when they can be shown to directly advance a substantial state interest.354 Although there are
many reasons from a population perspective to question the Supreme Court’s current application of the doctrine,355 its core principle remains compelling: laws that infringe upon speech in the name
of protecting health should protect health.356 Given the current evidence, laws that broadly restrict e-cigarette advertising cannot meet
that test.
B. The Harm Principle
The harm principle offers the most well-established justification
for public health laws. Most infectious disease laws rest upon it. So
do many laws that target NCDs.357 For the time being, however, we
do not know that e-cigarettes harm population health so as to justify
banning their sale to adults, or severely limiting the market, as
would happen through premarket review, especially if 2007 remains
354

Cent. Hudson Gas & Elect. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
564 (1980).
355
Current doctrine places high hurdles on public health laws regulating commercial speech. For a discussion and critique of current law, see Kevin Outterson,
Higher First Amendment Hurdles for Public Health Regulation, 365 NEW ENG. J.
MED. e13 (2011).
356
There are reasons to believe that the Court now applies the Central Hudson
test so strictly that almost no regulation of advertising can pass muster. From a
public health perspective, and indeed, based upon the justifications set forth
above, that’s highly problematic. See id. at e13(2). Laws regulating commercial
speech require more justification than those that infringe upon lesser liberties
(such as the right to smoke indoors); given the state of the evidence, advertising
restrictions cannot at this time meet that test.
357
Lawrence O. Gostin, Public Health Law in a New Century: Part III: Public
Health Regulation: A Systematic Evaluation, 283 JAMA 3118, 3118 (2000).
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the predicate date.358 Although the risk of poisoning and fires (especially aboard airplanes) may warrant targeted regulations,359 the evidence suggests e-cigarettes do not pose the type of proximal harm
to bystanders, i.e., secondhand smoke, created by cigarettes.360 Rather, by reducing cigarette consumption, e-cigarettes may reduce
third-party exposure to secondhand smoke, or even fire. If so, regulations impeding access to e-cigarettes may harm public health.
Likewise, regulations such as the premarket review that would restrict entries into the e-cigarette market might harm health either by
increasing the price of e-cigarettes relative to cigarettes or by slowing innovations by smaller manufacturers that might reduce the risks
associated with e-cigarettes. Note that this is so even if e-cigarettes
are not harmful to individual users.
Many public health advocates nevertheless worry that widespread use of e-cigarettes may undermine tobacco control efforts
and ultimately increase rates of smoking.361 This possibility must be
taken seriously. When we think about harm to others we need to
consider not only the proximal harm, but also the ways in which the
social environment influences health risks across populations. Thus
if, as public health advocates fear, the widespread use of e-cigarettes

358

See supra text accompanying notes 318–29.
See supra text accompanying notes 233–237; 249–250. To address the risk
of poisoning due to liquid nicotine, Congress recently passed the Childhood Nicotine Poisoning Prevention Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-116, 130 Stat. 3 (2016)
(to be codified at 15 U.S.C. 1477a). This act requires that all liquid nicotine be
packaged in accordance with the standards set forth in 16 C.F.R. 1700.15 and 16
C.F.R. 1700.20 which relate to child resistant packaging.
360
See supra text accompanying note 248.
361
Toni Clarke, E-Cig Use Soared, Cigarette Use Fell Among U.S. Youth in
2014: CDC, REUTERS (Apr. 16, 2015, 3:04 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/16/us-ecigarettes-cdc-data-idUSKBN0N723O20150416 (stating that
data of increased e-cigarette usage among middle and high school students
“sparked alarm among tobacco control advocates who fear e-cigarettes will create
a new generation of nicotine addicts who may eventually switch to conventional
cigarettes”).
359

2016]

PATERNALISM, SELF-GOVERNANCE, AND PUBLIC HEALTH

953

renormalizes smoking and increases cigarette consumption, a population-based approach to the harm principle would justify regulations restricting adult access to or use of e-cigarettes.362
For now, however, the science does not support such conclusions.363 The application of the population perspective’s capacious
interpretation of the harm principle demands respect for the perspective’s own limits. In other words, if the justification for a regulation
rests on the harm principle, the scientific evidence must provide a
strong (although not necessarily conclusive) basis for believing the
regulation will reduce harm.
This is not to say the risks public health advocates worry about
are wholly implausible or should be ignored. As suggested above,
e-cigarettes present numerous risks, and it is quite possible the evidence will eventually show that their net risks to population health
outweigh their net population benefits. Moreover, because nicotine
is addictive, and marketing is fierce, use very well may become entrenched before the evidence is in, making it harder to regulate ecigarettes if and when they are shown to be harmful at a population
level. Still, if a public health regulation is to rest on the harm principle, there must be strong reason to believe the regulation will prevent harm to others. That case has yet to be made for most proposed
regulations of e-cigarettes.
C. Self-Governance
In the midst of scientific uncertainty, the self-governance rationale offers the most robust justification for regulating e-cigarettes. Because public health laws are the manifestation of populations’ positive liberty to secure their own health, populations may
adopt a precautionary approach and regulate e-cigarettes even
though the evidence of harm is not yet settled. Alternatively, popu-

362
Premarket review may also be justified to prevent the introduction of adulterants or especially dangerous ingredients and designs. Given the state of the evidence, however, we cannot know that premarket review will benefit rather than
harm public health.
363
Clarke, supra note 361 (quoting the director of the Center for Smoking
Cessation at Duke University acknowledging that data of increased e-cigarette
usage among youths “is equally amenable to the interpretation that e-cigarettes
are diverting young people away from cigarettes”).

954

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:879

lations may adopt a harm-reduction strategy and allow the proliferation of e-cigarettes, even though we do not yet know whether it will
work. If we take self-governance seriously, these choices are ultimately for affected populations to make.
The self-governance rationale, however, does not necessarily
support all regulations of e-cigarettes. Regulations resting on the
self-governance justification must comport with the limitations implied by that justification. Unfortunately, there is no magic formula
for determining if and when regulations can plausibly be asserted as
the product of self-governance. If we simply assume all duly enacted
regulations meet the test, the justification becomes meaningless. Yet
if we were to say that only those regulations that result from popular
referenda qualify, we would handcuff populations’ ability to adopt
a precautionary principle, or to seek the types of regulations (such
as import bans) that can be carried out only at the federal level. Nevertheless, if the justification for any specific law rests on self-governance, the claim of self-governance must be plausible.
There is strong reason to believe many regulations of e-cigarettes satisfy this test. For example, in cities such as Philadelphia364
and New York,365 city councils have voted to extend their public
smoking laws to e-cigarettes. In many jurisdictions these laws have
been enacted after considerable public debate. Proponents of some
of the regulations have explicitly noted that the science is not in, but
have argued for erring on the side of safety.366 Other communities

364

Dan Stamm & Vince Lattanzio, Philadelphia City Council Bans E-Cigarettes in Public Places, NBC10.COM, (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/health/E-Cigarette-Ban-Philly-252610201.html.
365
Scott Neuman, New York City Extends Smoking Ban to E-Cigarettes, NPR
(Dec. 19, 2013, 7:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2013/12/19/
255582225/new-york-extends-smoking-ban-to-e-cigarettes.
366
For example, Philadelphia City Councilman William K. Greenlee stated,
“I know they say, ‘Because we don’t know enough, don’t do anything . . . . I’m
saying, ‘Because we don’t know enough . . . we should take necessary precautions.” Troy Graham, E-cigarette Restrictions Pass Council, PHILLY.COM (Mar.
28, 2014, 5:58 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/heardinthehall/E-Cigarette-Restrictions-Pass-Council.html.
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have made the opposite decision.367 Either way, such choices by local elected bodies warrant respect if we are to take self-governance
seriously.368
Some forms of state and federal legislation explicitly addressing
e-cigarettes may also be justified, although less robustly, on the basis of self-governance. Given the many flaws in our political system,
there are serious reasons to question whether ordinary legislative
acts, especially those not arising from engaged social movements,
should qualify as acts of self-governance.369 Laws enacted without
full and open debate are especially problematic from a self-governance perspective. Still, we cannot presume prima facie that legislative actions, even when not justified on the basis of the harm principle or impaired agency, are invalid (as the paternalism critique
does), lest we disable populations from expressing their values and
using the political system to secure their own health. Many health
problems cannot be addressed at the local level; any presumption
that state or federal legislation is invalid would restrict populations’
positive liberty of self-governance. Hence a legislature’s decision to
regulate e-cigarettes to protect public health may be justifiable even
if it exceeds the scope of the impaired decision-making or harm principle justifications, and even if the legislative process is, as is usually the case, less than ideal.370
From a self-governance perspective, administrative action is far
more problematic, especially when undertaken in the absence of
clear legislative direction. Administrative action beyond the scope
of either the harm principle or the impaired agency justification is

367

The website of Consumer Advocates for Smokefree Alternatives Association (CASAA) lists several examples in which proposed regulations were not enacted by city councils. Successful CASAA Campaigns, CASAA, http://casaa.org/
Successful_Campaigns.html (last visited June 1, 2015).
368
A recent study offered a sobering caveat, finding that so-called astroturf
groups, supported by industry, originated a significant portion of the tweets opposing Chicago’s e-cigarette law as it was being debated by the city council. Jenine K. Harris et al., Tweeting for and Against Public Health Policy: Response to
the Chicago Department of Public Health’s Electronic Cigarette Twitter Campaign, 16 J. MED. INTERNET RES. e238 (2014).
369
See supra text accompanying note 150–160.
370
Importantly, the regulation of e-cigarettes does not appear to raise concerns
regarding stigmatization. See supra text accompanying notes 155–56.
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troubling in the absence of strong grassroots support. In such situations we may worry that health officials are acting in their own view
of what is good for a population, rather than carrying out the population’s wishes.
In the case of e-cigarettes, polls suggest strong public support
for some regulatory action. A 2014 poll by the Center for Prevention
at Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minnesota found that 79% of Minnesotans supported prohibiting indoor use of e-cigarettes in places
where smoking is prohibited.371 Other polls have likewise found
strong support for health warnings and banning the sale of e-cigarettes to minors.372 However, a 2014 Rasmussen poll found that only
51% of adults thought e-cigarettes should be regulated by the FDA
in the same manner as traditional cigarettes,373 and a 2013 poll by
libertarian-leaning Reason-Rupe found that 62% of Americans
thought e-cigarette use should be permitted in public places.374
Given these polls, it would be hard to conclude that an FDA decision to promulgate the deeming regulations went against the public’s wishes. However, the polls do not show overwhelming public
support for some of the specific provisions included within the
deeming regulations (such as premarket review) that exceed the
371

Center for Prevention, Poll: Minnesotans Strongly Support Prohibiting ECigarettes Use Indoors, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD MINNESOTA (Feb. 26, 2014),
http://www.centerforpreventionmn.com/newsroom/press-releases/poll%20minnesotans%20strongly%20support%20prohibiting%20ecigarette%20use%20indoors. The poll also found strong support for measures aimed at preventing ecigarette use by youth. Id.
372
See, e.g., C.S. Mott Children’s Hospital, 44 Percent of Adults Worry ECigarettes will Encourage Kids to Start Smoking Tobacco (Dec. 18, 2013),
http://www.mottchildren.org/news/archive/201312/44-percent-adults-worry-ecigarettes-will-encourage-kids (reporting that 65% of respondents support health
warnings and 86% support banning sales to minors); Tobacco Free Kids, Tobacco
Free Kids National Survey (Feb. 2015), http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/content/press_office/2015/2015_04_14_poll_questions.pdf (reporting high levels of
support for disclosures and regulations protecting youth).
373
51% Believe E-Cigarettes Should be Regulated by Federal Government,
RASMUSSEN REPORTS (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/lifestyle/general_lifestyle/april_2014/51_believe_e_cigarettes_
should_be_regulated_by_federal_government.
374
Emily Ekins, 62 Percent Think E-Cigarette Use in Public Should be Allowed Despite Expected FDA Regulations, REASON.COM (Dec. 19, 2013,
12:43 PM), http://reason.com/poll/2013/12/19/62-percent-think-e-cigarette-usein-pub2.
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scope of the impaired agency and harm principle justifications.
Moreover, little evidence exists of widespread public engagement
with the issue, as with debates over indoor smoking laws.375 It is
true, as previously discussed, that many tobacco control groups have
become deeply involved in the issue of e-cigarettes. And the large
number of comments submitted in response to the NPRM evinces
considerable public and industry interest.376 In addition, the FDA
has held a series of public workshops to obtain information on ecigarettes and public health.377 Still, there remains scant evidence of
a strong grassroots movement demanding federal restrictions on the
sale of e-cigarettes.378 And in some states, legislative proposals to
375

Baehr, supra note 283, at 1673–75.
Under the Administrative Procedures Act, notice and comment rulemaking
provides the public with the opportunity to participate in and influence the rulemaking process. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). In this sense, it affords populations with
some opportunity to self-govern. See David J. Arkush, Direct Republicanism in
the Administrative Process, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1458, 1486 (advocating for a
deliberative democracy approach to notice and comment rulemaking); Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State,
81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1427 (2013). However, whether affected populations actually can influence the rulemaking process is questionable. See Seidenfeld, supra note 376, at 1434–35 (discussing the inherent limitations of notice
and comment rulemaking). In our less than ideal polity, the same can be said of
the legislative process. Still, for theoretical reasons if none other, the political legitimacy of administrative agencies remains more questionable than that of
elected bodies. See Arkush, supra note 376, at 1467–72 (reviewing the history of
legitimacy concerns relating to administrative agencies); Mark Seidenfield, A
Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1511, 1516–28 (1992) (reviewing the “shaky” constitutional foundations of the
administrative state).
377
A Public Workshop – Electronic Cigarettes and the Public Health,
FDA.GOV, http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/NewsEvents/ucm414814.htm
(last visited Mar. 25, 2016).
378
The most visible grassroots groups may be those who oppose laws that
treat e-cigarettes as comparable to cigarettes. For example, CASAA, which claims
to have over 113,000 members, has argued against the deeming regulations. The
FDA & Deeming Regulations of E-cigarettes, supra note 320; CASAA Podcast
Update November 2, 2015, CASAA (Nov. 4, 2015) http://blog.casaa.org/
2015/11/casaa-podcast-update-november-2-2015.html. Whether CASAA is a
genuine grassroots group, or a so-called astroturf group, is debatable. The organization’s bylaws, for example, permit up to 1/3 of its members to be from industry,
About CASAA, CASAA (Feb. 2015), http://casaa.org/About_CASAA.html. Similar groups exist at the state level. See, e.g., WISCONSIN SMOKE-FREE
ALTERNATIVES COALITION, SMOKING ORDINANCES AND ELECTRONIC
376
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require the licensing of vaping businesses have drawn considerable
opposition.379 Even some public health advocacy groups have noted
that e-cigarettes may reduce harm and have questioned stringent
regulatory approaches, even with respect to minors.380
The lack of a clear legislative mandate adds doubt as to whether
the deeming regulations can rest solely on the self-governance justification. Certainly, the regulations do not depend upon the type of
open-ended delegation that proved fatal to the FDA in Brown & Williamson.381 Rather they rest on the TCA, which specifically empowers the agency to regulate new tobacco products by promulgating
deeming regulations.382 Moreover, the TCA’s premarket review
provisions show that Congress recognized the possibility of new tobacco products,383 including modified harm products.384 Perhaps
most important, Congress explicitly authorized the FDA to review
all new and modified risk products and bar their entry into the market unless the agency found them appropriate for public health.385
For this reason, it can be argued that with the TCA Congress chose
a precautionary approach.
That conclusion, however, is contestable because the TCA is silent about the most critical question: under what circumstances
should the FDA deem a tobacco product subject to the regulations?
In other words, the TCA provides relatively clear guidance on the
choice between a precautionary and harm-reduction approach for
CIGARETTES (2014), https://tobacco.ucsf.edu/sites/tobacco.ucsf.edu/files/u9/
smoking-ordinances-and-electronic-cigarettes.pdf.
379
See e.g., Barbara Brosher, Proposed E-Cigarette Regulations Creating
Controversy, IND. PUB. MEDIA (Jan. 9, 2015) http://indianapublicmedia.org/news/proposed-ecigarette-regulations-creating-controversy-76774/ (explaining that vape stores and their customers say bans on e-cigarettes “punish[]
adults who are using the devices to quit smoking and give[] people less of an
incentive to make the switch”).
380
Liz Szabo, States Racing to Regulate E-Cigarettes, USA TODAY (Feb. 7,
2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/02/07/state-e-cigarette-bills/
22364765/.
381
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (1999).
382
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 387a(b) (2009).
383
Id. at §387j.
384
Id. at § 387k.
385
Id. For a discussion of the provision’s history, see Jim Solyst, Toward a
Comprehensive Policy on Nicotine Delivery Products and Harm Reduction, 67
FOOD & DRUG L. J. 393, 396–98 (2012).
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products subject to its regulation, but leaves it to the agency alone
to decide whether and under what circumstances new products
should be subject to the Act.
The 2015 actions of the House Appropriations Committee offer
at least that Committee’s views on the choices facing the FDA. By
endorsing the imposition of minimum age purchase requirements
and health warnings, and the restriction of vending machine purchases (which prevents minors from circumventing the minimum
age requirement),386 the Committee effectively supported the provisions of the deeming regulations that can be justified by the impaired
agency rationale. But the Committee also expressed disapproval of
requiring premarket review with a 2007 predicate date, stating that
it would subject “newly regulated categories of tobacco products—
some of which have the potential to play an important role in harm
reduction, and some of which hardly existed in commerce before
that date—[to] a more onerous approval process than cigarettes.”387
The Committee also added language to the appropriations bill for
the FDA that would force the agency to use the effective date of the
regulations, rather than 2007, as the predicate date.388 The Committee thus rejected a precautionary approach.
On its own, the Committee’s report does little to either shore up
or undermine the applicability of the self-governance justification
for the deeming regulations. Of course, if the proposal had become
law, the self-governance justification would become much more secure for the modified regulatory structure the Committee proposed;
but as noted previously, the regime that the Committee bill would
have put into place does not require the self-governance rationale
for its normative legitimacy.389 It is possible that the Committee’s
action will spark the type of open public debate that would bolster
the claim that self-governance supports premarket review. However,
in the absence of such debate or new legislation, it is difficult to
386
See H.R. Rep. No. 114-205, at 74. The Child Nicotine Poisoning Prevention Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-116, 130 Stat. 3 (2016), explicitly states that it
shall not be read to affect the Department of Health and Human Services’ authority to regulate liquid nicotine or e-cigarettes, including any authority under the
TCA, the NPRM or ANPRM.
387
H.R. Rep. No. 114-205, at 74.
388
Id. at 75.
389
See supra text accompanying notes 386–88.
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justify the premarket review provisions under any of the three justifications of the framework. And because the deeming regulations as
a whole necessarily entail premarket review, the regulations as a
whole sit on a tenuous normative foundation.
All this suggests that until the evidence of harm to others is more
settled, regulations of e-cigarettes that surpass those justified by impaired agency should derive from legislative rather than administrative bodies. Local legislatures may in fact be the preferable institution for regulating e-cigarettes, as they may be better-equipped to
reflect the views of affected populations on the choice between harm
reduction and the precautionary principle. Moreover, by allowing
significant variation among regulatory schemes, local laws may also
facilitate research on the effect of specific e-cigarette regulations on
cigarette use. In contrast, by establishing a nationwide regulatory regime that would preempt some local laws390 the deeming regulations
would reduce intra-jurisdictional variation, compromising the development of novel regulatory approaches as well as research on
their effectiveness.391 This may prolong the scientific uncertainty.
Perhaps more important, by imposing a nationwide regulatory regime for e-cigarettes before there is widespread public debate and
dialog about them, the regulations may forestall the very type of active community engagement that underlies the self-governance regulation.
CONCLUSION
A. Rethinking the Deeming Regulations
The choices regulators face regarding e-cigarettes are not easy.
Given the state of the science, it is unclear whether the imposition
of the tobacco control regulatory regime on e-cigarettes will help or
harm population health. And given the lack of public debate and
390

21 U.S.C. § 387p(a)(2) (2012).
Researchers could still study the impact of the deeming regulations by
comparing smoking rates before and after the regulations’ implementation. See
Scott Burris et al., Moving from Intersection to Integration: Public Health Law
Research and Public Health Law Systems and Services Research, 90 MILBANK
Q. 375, 392 (2012) (recommending “evaluation [of] health effects and costs associated with . . . regulations . . . before and after implementation”).
391
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legislative action, except at the local level, it is unclear how affected
populations want regulators to act in the face of this uncertainty.
The constraints imposed by the TCA only add to the FDA’s dilemma. The impaired agency rationale provides strong support for a
wide range of regulations that are seemingly quite popular, including ingredient listing, warning labels as to the product’s addictiveness, and banning sales to minors. The harm principle also supports
granting the agency authority to act against adulterated e-cigarettes
and require childproof packaging. Given the state of the evidence,
however, none of the three responses to the paternalism critique support applying the TCA’s premarket review provisions to e-cigarettes.
Unfortunately, although the TCA gives FDA broad authority,
the agency cannot pick and choose among many of its provisions. If
e-cigarettes are deemed to be subject to the Act, the premarket review provisions will go into effect, either with a 2007 predicate date
or, if the FDA changes its views and believes it has more discretion,
with a later date. Either way, premarket review will impose a precautionary approach with potentially serious ramifications for the
development of the e-cigarette market, one with at least the potential
for adverse (or positive) health consequences.
In an ideal world, the public would debate the issue, and Congress would solve the regulatory dilemma by giving the FDA clearer
guidance on how to proceed. In the absence of legislation, however,
continued delay may be the FDA’s most supportable action. Although such delay risks the growth of the e-cigarette market, it provides the opportunity for the agency to attain a clearer picture about
the population health effects of e-cigarettes and their regulation. It
also permits populations to become more fully engaged in the discussion of how to proceed amid scientific uncertainty. In other
words, delay allows populations to exercise their right of self-governance to protect their health.
B. Justifications for Public Health Law
Although public health scholars and advocates may be tempted
to cast aside the paternalism critique as overblown and inappropriately applied, they do so at their own peril. Even when public health
laws are not paternalistic, the critique has proved to be rhetorically
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powerful. It resonates with a public that distrusts government and
values individual liberty.
In response to the critique, public health legal scholars have offered three broad classes of normative justifications: impaired
agency, the harm principle, and, most robustly, self-governance.
When applied with a public health perspective, they offer support
steeped in the liberal tradition for a wide range of public health laws.
They also help explain why the distinction between the old and new
public health is misleading. Indeed, the justifications apply with
equal force to both infectious-disease laws and regulations targeting
NCDs.
But all justifications have their limitations. If public health advocates are to successfully counter the paternalism critique, they
must recognize that the conditions upon which they seek to justify
public health laws—impaired agency, harm to others, or self-governance—need to be met. Respect for the positive liberties of health
and self-governance requires respect for the decisions that engaged
populations render in the face of uncertainty. If public health advocates want to claim the mantle of self-governance, they must take it
seriously.

